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INTRASTATE OFFERING EXEMPTION:
RULE 147-PROGRESS OR STALEMATE?
BY DONALD B. GARDINER*
After publication for one year in proposed form,1 rule 1472 under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended,- has been adopted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, effective for transactions commenced on or
after March 1, 1974.1 The rule, which was adopted with some significant
changes from that first proposed,-" is designed to chart for issuers of
securities a course of safe passage through the "intrastate offering" ex-
emption from the registration requirements of § 5 of the Act.0 The
* Member of the Ohio Bar. The assistance of Kim L. Swanson, an associate in the firm
of which the author is a member, is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Rule 147 was first proposed in Securities Act Release No. 5349 (Jan. 8, 1973), CCH4
FED. SEC. L RPmR. 5 79,617 [hereinafter cited as SA Rel. 5349].
2 17 CFR § 230.147, 1 CCH FED. SEc. L RPTR. 5 2253 [hereinafter cited as rule
147]. The complete text of rule 147 is set out at note 147 infra.
3 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act].
4 Rule 147 was adopted in final form in Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974),
1 CCH FED. SEC. L. RPTR. 5 2253 [hereinafter cited as SA Rel. 5450]. SA Rel. 5450
provides: "The Commission, acting pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, particularly Sec.
tion 3(a)(11) and 19(a) thereof, hereby adopts Rule 147 effective for issues of securities
commenced on or after March 1, 1974." The purposes of rule 147 are, as stated in SA
Rel. 5450, to provide "objective standards to facilitate compliance with Section 3(a)(11)
of the Act" and to "provide, to the extent feasible, more certainty in determining when
the exemption provided by that Section of the Act is available." These purposes are ex-
pressed in the context of the Commission's equally compelling concerns to protect investors
by coordinating and integrating the Act's continuous disclosure system with its various exemp.
tions and to assure "that the intrastate offering exemption is used only for the purpose
that Congress intended, i.e., local financing of companies primarily intrastate in character."
SA Rel. 5450. Rule 147 is another in the Commission's "140 Series" of rules designed
"to provide protection to investors and, where consistent with that objective, to add certain.
ty, to the extent feasible, to the determination of when the registration provisions of the
Act apply." The other rules in this series are rule 144 (relating to resales of "control"
and "restricted" securities), Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), 17 CAF.R,
230.144, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. RPTR. 5 2705A; rule 145 (requiring registration of securities
issued in certain business combinations), Securities Act Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972),
17 CFR 230.145, 1 CCH FED. SEc. L RpR. 5 3011A; and rule 146 (providing objective
guidelines for compliance with the "non-public" offering exemption under Section 4(2) of
the Act), Securities Act Release No. 5487 (April 23, 1974), Reg. § 230.146, 1 CC1H FED.
SEc. L. RPTR. 5 2708.
,See notes 86, 117, 122 & 123 infra and accompanying text.
6 Section 5 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e'(1970), provides:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce,
by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the pur-
pose of sale or for delivery after sale.
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exemption, contained in § 3(a) (11),- exempts securities that are part
of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single
state or territory by an issuer that is a resident of and doing business
within that state or territory. The rule does not provide the exclusive
means for compliance with § 3(a)(11),s and the rule's objective stan-
dards and definitions of statutory terms are not necessarily applicable to
transactions effected outside of the r.le. However, due particularly to
the comprehensive scope of the rule and the refinement and narrowing
it represents of certain pre-rule administrative and judicial interpreta-
tions, the rule's substantive provisions undoubtedly will have a signifi-
cant effect on subsequent judicial decisions involving non-rule transac-
tions relying on § 3(a) (11).'
This article is devoted, first, to an examination of the current admin-
istrative and judicial interpretations of the exemption in light of the
probable impact the substantive provisions of rule 147 will have on non-
rule transactions, and, second, to an analysis of the specific provisions
of the rule with a view to anticipating possible interpretive and opera-
tional difficulties. Such an endeavor necessitates a preliminary consid-
eration of the basic operation of the exemption and the current status of
interpretive questions not affected by the rule. The more comprehensive
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus re-
lating to any security with respect to which a registration statement has been
filed under this subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of
section 77j of this title; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce
any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accom-
panied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a)
of section 77j of this tide.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any pro-
spectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as
to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order
or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public
proceeding or examination under section 77h of this tide.
The articulated purpose of Congress in setting this procedure was to inform investors of
facts concerning securities offered for sale and to protect investors against fraud and mis-
representation. Additionally, Congress felt this system would enable "honest enterprise"
to seek capital from the public and restore the publics confidence in the securities market.
For a detailed analysis of the registration process, see I L Loss, SECURMES REGULATIOm,
178 et. seq. (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
7 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970).
8 Rule 147, Preliminary Note 1.
9 It is unlikely- that the Commission's administrative interpretations of the exemption
in non-rule transactions will be substantially different from those reflected in the rule. See
notes 53-60, 110 & 116 infra and accompanying text.
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treatment of the historical development of § 3 (a) (11) is reserved to the
able efforts of other commentators. 0
I. THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION-
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Section 3(a) (11) of the Act provides:
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of, this title shall
not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(11) Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only
to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer
of such security is a person resident and doing business within, or, if
a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State
or Territory. 11
As is often the case when an exemptive provision deals with several
significant concepts in few words, use of the intrastate offering exemp-
tion is fraught with legal and practical pitfalls not readily apparent
from the statutory context alone.' "
A. Nature of Exemptive Relief; Jurisdictional Means
Feared by some'3 as the most misunderstood facet of the exemption
is that, notwithstanding the section's apparent grant of total exemption,
it provides relief only from the registration requirements of the Act and
specifically not from the antifraud provisions contained in §§ 12(2) and
17."4 With this concern in mind, the Commission repeatedly has em-
"OSee I Loss 591-605; 11 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-SECURITIES REGULATION, § 3.12
(W. Sowards ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited as Sowards--SECURITIES REGULATION]; Hertz,
Federal Securities Act of 1933-The Intrastate Exemption of § 3tai(1l1)-Fact or Fiction?
34 DICTA 289 (1957); McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transacions Under the Federal Secn.
rtides Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937 (1959); Sosin, The Intrastate Exemption: Public Oiler.
ings and the Issue Concept, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 110 (1964); Comment, The Intrastate
Exemption: Current Lau, Local Practice and the Wheat Report, 31 OHIO ST. LJ. 521
(1970).
11 15 U.S.C. § 7c(a)(11) (1970). As a matter of presentation, the text of this article
omits reference to "territory" when discussing the exemption or the rule, although where
the term "state" is used, it would be appropriate to substitute the term "territory" or add
it in the disjunctive. Section 2(6) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(6) (1970) defines "'Territory"
to mean "Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, and the insular
possessions of the United States."
12 An example of such a provision is § 4(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2) (1970),
which exempts from the registration requirements "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering," which has spawned considerable litigation and administrative enforce.
ment actions. The Commission has recently adopted rule 146, see note 4 supra, to clarify
the section and provide objective standards for compliance.
13 McCauley, supra note 10, at 958.
14 Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970) provides:
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phasized the applicability of these civil liability and antifraud provi-
sions to securities transactions otherwise exempted from the registration
requirements by § 3(a) (11) .1
A similar source of confusion focuses on the relationship between
Any person who--
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of sec-
tion 77c [§ 3 of the Act] of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
of said section), by the use of any means or instrument of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him, may sue either at law or in equity in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Section 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), the Act's general antifraud section, provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, to publish, give publicity to, or circulate any notice, circular, advertisement,
newspaper, article, letter, investment service, or communication which, though not
purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security for a consideration
received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospective, of such con-
sideration and the amount thereof.
(c) The exemptions provided in section 77c of this tite shall not apply to the
provisions of this section.
Additionally, § 3(a)(11) does not exempt an issuer from the registration, reporting, proxy
solicitation, and short-swing profit provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 781(a), (b) & (g); 78m; 78n; & 78p (1970). Section 24(d) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended [15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 (d)], provides that Section 3(a) (11)
of the Securities Act of 1933 "shall not apply to any security of which a registered investment
company is the issuer ... " Accordingly, in discussing the exemption and rule 147, it is as-
sumed that the issuer of the securities in question is not such a registered investment company
or an "investment company" as defined in the 1940 Act. See generally, Sosin, note 10 upra
at 126-127. Debt securities exempt under § 3(a) (11) of the Act are also exempt from all
provisions of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd (a) (4) (A)
(1970).
l5See Securities Act Release No. 1459 (May 29, 1937), 17 C.F.R. 231.1459, 1 CCH
FED. SEc. L RPTR.- 5 2260 [hereinafter cited as SA Rel. 1459]; Securities Act Release No.
4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 17 C.F.R. 231.4434, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L RPTR. 3 2270 [hereinafter
cited as SA Rel. 4434]; SA Rel. 5349; and SA Rel. 5450.
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use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce in connection with
the offer or sale of securities, and the availability of the exemption and
the applicability of the antifraud provisions. The applicability of both
the registration provisions of § 5 and the antifraud provisions of §§
12(2) and 17 is jurisdictionally limited to those transactions involving
the direct or indirect use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce ("facilities of interstate com-
merce") or use of the mails,1" collectively referred to as the "jurisdic-
tional means." Liability under the antifraud provisions is conditioned
upon use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce in connection
with a particular offer or sale of securities, 17 and such liability exists not-
withstanding full compliance with § 3(a) (11).1'  Conversely, the intra-
state offering exemption is not dependent on non-use of the mails or
facilities of interstate commerce in any phase of distribution, 0 although
liability for any particular sale is likewise conditioned upon use of the
jurisdictional means.20  Accordingly, securities issued in a transaction
complying with the intrastate exemption may be offered and sold with-
out registration through use of the mails and the facilities of interstate
commerce, may be advertised for sale by radio and television or news-
papers or other means of communication that may also reach residents
of other states (provided the offer is expressly limited to residents of
the issuer's state of residence), and may be delivered after sale to resident
purchasers through the mails or by facilities of interstate commerce.21
Delivery by such means could even be effected directly to a resident pur-
16 See notes 6 & 14 supra.
17 Id.
18 See Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1969) where
the court, after affirming the district court's holding that the § 3(a)(11) exemption was
satisfied, stated:
The District Court, however, further found that the above conclusion disposed
of all other issues. With this we do not agree and must therefore again remand
this case to the District Court for further proceedings on all other issues raised in
the pleadings, namely sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934. Actions under these sections may be
pursued even though the securities are exempt from regiscration requirements, and
plaintiffs below were entitled to be heard on these issues.
See also Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 900.01 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Sowards-S]3-
cURmES REGULATION at 3-34.
19 SA Rels. 1459 & 4434. If non-use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce
were required, there would be no need for the § 3(a)(11) exemption since the transaction
would necessarily be outside the jurisdictional limits of § 5 of the Act.
20 See note 6 supra and notes 44 & 45 supra and accompanying text. Sea also 1 Loss
207-211.
21 SA Rels. 1459 & 4434. See also 1 Loss 602; Sowards, The Intrastale Exemptiot,
2 REv. SEC. REG. 922-923 (1969).
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chaser -who may be temporarily out of state or to his designated non-
resident agent or custodian.'
Despite the location of the exemption in § 3 of the Act which pur-
ports to exempt the complying securities from the registration require-
ments forever,' the intrastate exemption is regarded as a transactional
exemption from registration similar to the exemptions afforded under
§ 4 of the Act. '4 Accordingly, § 3(a) (11) is available only with respect
to the offer and sale of securities in a transaction then meeting all require-
ments of the Section, and each subsequent offer or sale of those securities
by jurisdictional means must either be effected pursuant to registration
or under circumstances then qualifying for one of the exemptions from
registration contained in §§ 3 or 4 of the Act."n
B. Civil Liability
Loss of the-exemption can have disastrous consequences for the issuer
and others involved in selling the securities. The civil liability provi-
sions of § 12(1) provide that "any person who offers or sells a security"
in violation of the registration and prospectus requirements of § 5 is
liable to the purchaser for rescission or for damages if the purchaser no
longer owns the security.20 Moreover, § 15 of the Act imposes on each
person who controls a person liable under § 12 joint and several liability
to the same extent as the controlled seller, subject to a defense of lack
2 2 SA ReL 1459.
23 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
2 4 See SA Rels. 1459, 4434, 5349, & 5450. For an opposing view contained in the
legislative history of the exemption, see the memorandum prepared by the sponsor of the
1934 amendment which relocated the intrastate exemption under § 3(a) from § 5(c) of
the Act where it bad originally appeared. That memorandum stated:
The primary purpose of the amendment is to make clear that the exemptions ac-
corded by the present sections 4(3) and 5(c) of the act extend beyond the particular
transactions therein covered, to the security itself. Considerable confusion has ex-
isted on this point, and the amendment is merely a confirmation of interpretations
of the sections by the Commission.
78 CONG. REc. 8669 (1934). This historical fragment has not been specifically discussed
by the Commission or in the reported cases. The amendment to § 3(a) (11) and its predeces-
sor are summarized in note 48 supra.
25
"Persons who acquire securities from issuers or affiliates in transactions complying
with the rule would acquire unregistered securities that could only be reoffered and resold
pursuant to an exemption from the registration provisions of the Act." SA Rd. 5450.
See also 1 Loss 708-710.
2615 U.S.C. § 771 (1) (1970) provides:
Any person who-(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77c of this
title . shall he liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may
sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he
no longer owns the security.
The same rescissionary and damage remedies are available under § 12(2). See note 14 suprx.
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OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of either knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the exis-
tence of the facts on which the controlled person's liability is based.,2
Sellers liable under § 12(1) are a purchaser's immediate seller and that
seller's selling agents (e.g., the issuer and its agents in a non-under-
written offering, and the issuer and the underwriter and its agents in a
"best-efforts" underwriting). 8 Where ownership of the securities has
passed, however quickly, through additional hands in the distribution
process before reaching the ultimate purchaser, each buyer in the chain
may recover from, and only from, his immediate seller and its agents.
For example, in a "firm-commitment" 2  underwriting involving one
or more underwriters who purchase the securities from the issuer direct-
ly for resale to the public or in part for resale to participating dealers
who in turn sell to the public, the ultimate investor could recover only
from the dealer selling to him; that dealer could in turn recover only
from the underwriter or underwriters; and the latter only from the is-
suer.
30
Since each purchaser of any of the securities comprising a part of an
offering for which the exemption is lost is entitled to rescission or dam-
ages with respect to his transaction, whether or not that particular
transaction caused the loss of the exemption, 81 issuers and underwrit-
ers and their respective controlling persons face ultimate liability for the
aggregate selling price, plus interest, of the entire offering. Participat-
27 Section 15 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970) provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or
more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls
any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall also beliable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason
of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
Rule 405 under the Act, Reg. § 230.405 (1947), defines "'control' (including the terms
'controlling,' 'controlled by' and 'under common control with')" to mean "the possession,
direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of a person, whether through ownership of voting securities, by contract, or other.
wise." See also Sommer, Who's "In Control"?--S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAw. 559 (1966).
28In a "best-efforts" underwriting, the underwriter commits to sell the securities on
behalf of the issuer as its agent and its compensation takes the form of an agent's commission,
See 1 Loss 171-72.
20 In a total "firm-commitment" underwriting, the underwiter or underwriters contract
to purchase the entire issue of securities from the issuer at a fixed price and resell them
to participating dealers and the public at the higher public offering price (less a concession
to dealers). See 1 Loss at 163-71.
30 For a general discussion of these liabilities, see Sosin, note 10 supra, at 117-21; 3 Loss
1692-98 & 1712-20 (1961); 6 Loss 3827-31 & 3834-42 (1961).
31 SA Rel. 4434; 1 Loss at 592-93.
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ing dealers face similar liability to the extent of their own selling ac-
tivities.32
As can be seen, issuers and underwriters are subjected to liability not
only for claims based on their own or their agents' activities causing a
loss of the exemption, but, presumably, also for claims based on such
activities by others, such as prohibited resales by investors or dealers
having no connection with the offering. Should the issuer or the under-
writer be liable in the latter situation, assuming it acted in good faith and
the disqualifying element was free of any taint of conspiracy or sub-
terfuge on its part? Professor Loss persuasively argues that the issuer,
at least, should not be liable:
Unless the standard [for issuer liability] is one of due care-which in-
dudes reasonable supervision of all selling agents and may well require
something more than an automatic acceptance of the buyer's [residency]
representation-the exemption is virtually read out of the statute. Per-
haps it should be. But that presumably is why Congress sits. Mean-
while, although it is usually impracticable to litigate with the Commis-
sion when an issuer is primarily interested in completing its financing,
a seller against whom a claim is made for rescission or damages under §
12(1) would be well advised to defend if he thinks he used reasonable
care.ss
Although the question of liability may depend upon a failure to con-
form to some standard of care, this rationale has not prevented the
Commission from seeking injunctions against the issuer and others
prohibiting further sales after the exemption has been lost.3 4
32This catastrophic liability potential has motivated many issuers and underwriters (and
to a lesser degree, participating dealers) to enter into complex cross-indemnification arrange-
ments in underwritten intrastate offerings for purposes of allocating the potential liability
among them based on some semblance of causation or fault for loss of the exemption.
However, a party to such indemnification agreements may not be able to recover damages
under circumstances where it participated in, or perhaps, had actual knowledge of, transac-
tions or events dearly causing a loss of the exemption. See Globus v. Law Research Serv,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-89 (2d Cir. 1969), holding that an underwriter which had actual
knowledge of an omission of material facts in an offering circular could not enforce an
indemnity agreement against the issuer and its officers when an action was brought by share-
holders of the corporation charging the president of the corporation and the underwriter
with violations of the federal securities laws.
3s 1 Loss 604-05. The Commission has provided (perhaps unwittingly) some support
for a standard of due care in SA rel 4434: "The mere obtaining of formal representations of
residence... should not be relied upon without more as establishing the availability of the
exemption... ." [emphasis added]. Perhaps the "more" is diligent inquiry and the reason-
able supervision of selling agents suggested by Professor Loss. Rule 147, however, allows
no room for a due care standard in view of the provisions of subparagraph (d) which pro-
vides that offers and sales "..shall be made only to persons resident within the state..
[emphasis supplied].
34Id. 604. Other sanctions available to the Commission include revoking the broker-
dealer registration of the principal underwriters; requiring, as part of a subsequent registra-
tion, an offer of rescission and redemption of all sales consummated as part of the non-
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What of the liability of dealers effecting transactions in the securi-
ties as nonparticipants in the intrastate distribution? If the dealer
represents only the buyer 'and the sale is executed upon an unsolicited
order from his customer, that transaction by the dealer is exempt from
registration under § 4(4) of the Act."' If the dealer (including an
underwriter no longer acting as such) is acting as principal or solicits the
buy order, the transaction is also exempt, under § 4(3), unless it takes
place "prior to the expiration of forty days after the first date upon
which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or
through an underwriter," or unless the security sold by the dealer con-
stitutes all or any part of his unsola allotment as a dealer participating
in the offering."  Accordingly, the nonparticipating dealer acting as
principal or as agent in a solicited sale will be exposed to liability with
respect to his transactions during the forty-day period should the intra-
state exemption be lost for any reason, whether or not caused by that
dealer.37  This risk is aggravated by the fact that a nonparticipating
exempt offering; requiring disclosure of the issuer's contingent liability under § 12(1) in
such registration and in reports filed under § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; lid
recommending criminal prosecution. See 31 OHIo ST. L.J., supra note 10, at 532.
35 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1970) provides: "The provisions of section 77e of this title
shall not apply to . . .(4) brokers' transactions executed upon customers' orders on any
exchange or in the over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders." So
also 1 Loss 700-06; 4 Loss 2666-73.
36 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) provides:
The provisions of section 77e of this title shall not apply to-
(3) transactions by a dealer (including an underwriter no longer acting as an under.
writer in respect of the security involved in such transaction), except-
(A) transactions taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the first
date upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or
by or through an underwriter.
(B) transactions in a security as to which a registration statement has been filed
taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the effective date of such
registration statement or prior to the expiration of forty days after the first date
upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by
or through an underwriter after such effective date, whichever is later (excluding
in the computation of such forty days any time during which a stop order issued
under section 77h of this title is in effect as to the security), or such shorter pc-
riod as the Commission may specify by rules a'nd regulations or order, and
(C) transactions as to securities constituting the whole or a part of an unsold
allotment to or subscription by such dealer as a participant in the distribution
of such securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter.
With respect to transactions referred to in clause (B), it securities of the issuer have
nor previously been sold pursuant to an earlier effective registration statement the
applicable period, instead of forty days, shall be ninety days, or such shorter period
as the Commission may specify by rules and regulations or order.
37See 1 Loss 595-97. See also SA Rel. 1459. In SA Rel. 4434 the Commission
stated: "It is incumbent upon the issuer, underwriter, dealers and other persons connected
with the offering to make sure that it does not become an interstate distribution through
resales. It is understood to be customary for such persons to obtain assurances that pur-
chases are not made with a view to resale to nonresidents."
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dealer usually is remote from the initial offering and cannot readily
ascertain whether or not the exemption is available or even know when
the offering commenced (for purposes of computing the forty-day pe-
riod). The caveat to the nonparticipating dealer is apparent-it should
assure itself as to the date of the commencement of the offering and re-
frain from soliciting or effecting as principal resales even to residents for
at least forty days, and, if the offering has not by then been completed,
it should consider refraining further until completed lest it appear to be
a participant in the distribution.
Even if the nonparticipating dealer's transactions are exempt as to it
under § 4(3), that dealer's resales to nonresidents after the forty-day pe-
riod of securities that are part of an offering still in progress could
than destroy the exemption for the entire offering, resulting in liabil-
ity for the underwriter or participating dealer selling to such nonpar-
ticipating dealer, and, quite possibly, for the issuer.38
Perhaps due in part to this large liability exposure § 13 of the Ace'
provides a relatively short statute of limitations. Actions for recovery
under § 12(1) must be brought within one year of the alleged viola-
tion, but in no event later than three years after the security was bona
fide offered to the public. As a result of this overriding three-year lim-
itation, Professor Loss has observed that "it is literally possible for the
statute to expire before the purchaser acquires the security in the case of
a very slow offering which may still be going on after three years! '40
C. Strict Construction; Commission Attitude
Because the Act is remedial, the burden of proving the availability
of an exemption rests with the person seeking to rely upon it,4 ' and the
terms of the exemption are strictly construed against the claimant.4 2 For
38 Id.
39 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970) provides:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or
771(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue
statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created un-
der section 771(1) of this title, unless brought within one year after the violation
upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a
liability crea:ed under section 77k or 771(1) of this title more than three years after
the security was bona fide offered to the public or under section 771(2) of this tide
more than three years after the sale.
40 3 Loss 1743.
4 1 SA Rels. 4434, 5349, 5450; Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC. 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d
Cir. 1959); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); SEC v. Culpepper,
270 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. McDonald Invest. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343, 346
(D. Minn. 1972).
4 2 SA Rels. 4434, 5349, & 5450; SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mining Co., 95 F.2d 699,
701 (9th Cir. 1938).
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example, it is clear that a single sale or a single offer-whether or not
accompanied by a subsequent sale and irrespective of the fact that the
offering was terminated prior to any sales-to a nonresident will destroy
the exemption.4 If all the securities are not offered and sold in com-
plete compliance with the exemption, the exemption is lost forever not
only for the noncomplying securities but for all the securities consti-
tuting a part of that issue, including that portion offered and sold exclu-
sively to residents and otherwise in compliance with the exemption.44
This is true even if the noncomplying element of the offering did not in-
volve use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce, although only
those purchasers (whether resident or nonresident) purchasing their se-
curities through jurisdictional means would be entitled to recovery of
their investment under the civil liability provisions of the Act discussed
under the preceding caption.45
Nor is there any relief for "de minimus" transgressions.40 In one
Commission proceeding where an applicant for registration as a brok-
er-dealer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had previously ef-
fected an unregistered offering of 30,000 shares of its common stock for
an aggregate of $150,000, twenty of these shares (.07%) were found to
have been sold to a resident of a bordering state for $100. The Com-
mission concluded that this single, minimal sale to a nonresident de-
stroyed the intrastate exemption for the entire offering and that the re-
sulting violation of § 5 was a suffiient basis for denying the broker-
dealer application.4 7
The exemption for purely intrastate offerings has been a part of the
Act since 1933, and has survived to date without substantive change.45
43 See Professional Investors, Inc., 37 SEC 173 (1956) (denial of broker-dealer registra
tion of Indiana broker because of sale of 20 of 30,000 shares to single Illinois resident);
Universal Serv. Corp., 37 SEC 559 (1957) (single" sale to nonresident destroying exemption);
Ned J. Bowman, 39 SEC 879 (1960) (mere offer to a nonresident would defeat the exemp.
tion); Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mont. 1964) (single sale to nonresident
defeats the exemption).
44 SA Rel. 4434 provides: "If any part of the issue is offered or sold to a nonresident
the exemption is unavailable not only for the securities so sold, but for all securities forming
a part of the issue, including those sold to residents."
45 See 1 Loss 593.
46Associated Investors Securities, Inc., 41 SEC 160 (1962); Professional Investors, Inc.,
37 SEC 173 (1956); Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965). In Capital
Funds, the court found that the sale of two blocks of 1,000 shares (out of a total offering
of 60,000 shares) to nonresidents destroyed the exemption.
47 Professional Investors, Inc., 37 SEC 173 (1956).
48The exemption first briefly appeared as § 5(c) of the Act and provided:
The provisions of this section relating to the use of the mails shall not apply to the
sale of any security where the issue of which it is a part is sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such securities is a
person resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by
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The Commission consistently has maintained the legislative purpose to
be that of affording an exemption only to local financing by local in-
vestors for local businesses where the distribution of securities is genu-
inely local in character.49  The most comprehensive judicial review of the
legislative purpose of the intrastate exemption is contained in the opin-
ion of the Sixth Circuit in Chapman v. Dunn.' The Court concluded
that the broad legislative purpose of § 3(a)(11) was to exempt from
registration only those issues of securities which were being effectively
regulated by state authorities, and implied that the Commission's concept
of genuinely local financing is wholly consistent with this interpretation
of the legislative intent.5' The Commission, because of the obvious prac-
tical and political difficulties in assessing the regulatory capabilities of
state securities agencies on a case-by-case basis, has not relied on the
Chapman approach in determining the availability of the exemption,
and seems content to rely on a more uniform approach of narrowly con-
struing the terms of the exemption within the Commission's more general
concept of "local financing for local businesses."' 2
When attempting to anticipate the Commission's position with re-
spect to the exemption's applicability to specific rule 147 and non-rule
transactions, it is important to be aware that the Commission appears to
have developed a visceral distrust of the exemption-beyond that which
skeptics might ordinarily suspect a regulatory agency to hold for a trou-
blesome exemption. This attitude may be spawned by a difficulty in re-
conciling the exemption with the overall disclosure objectives of the
Act, particularly in public intrastate offerings, and is reflected by more
than the Commission's history of narrow construction. It may be most
recently observed in the following text from the Commission's explan-
atory release adopting rule 147, which appears to cast doubt on the wis-
dom of the exemption:
and doing business within, such State or Territory. 38 Stat. 74 (1933).
As part of a package of other amendments to the Act, original § 5 (c) was repealed and
re-enacted as § 3(a) (11) in Title I1 of the legislation better known for its passage of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934). Section 3(a) (11) has remained
untouched since, with the one exception contained in the general amendments to the Act in
1954 which added the words "offered and" preceding the word "sold." The effect of this
amendment was to preserve (not enlarge) the exemption's prohibition against interstate offers
as well as interstate sales and was necessitated by that portion of the 1954 amendments estab-
lishing a separate definition of the term "offer" which had theretofore been included within
the definition of -sale."
4 9 SA Rels. 1459, 4434, & 5450; SEC v. McDonald Invest. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343,
346 (D. Minn. 1972).
50 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969).
51 Id. at 156-57t
52 This interpretation is stressed in both SA Rel 5349 proposing rule 147 and SA Rel.
5450 adopting the rule.
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Congress apparently believed that a company whose operations are re-
stricted to one area should be able to raise money from investors in the
immediate vicinity without having to register the securities with a federal
agency. In theory, the investors would be protected both by their proxi-
mity to the issuer and by state regulation. (emphasis supplied)68
Consistent with a doubt of the appropriateness of the exemption for in-
trastate offerings essentially public in character, the Commission has of-
ten cautioned that such offerings may encounter considerable difficulty
in meeting the conditions of the exemption. As early as 1937, for ex-
ample, the Commission's General Counsel stated:
From a practical point of view; the provisions of [Section 3(a)(11))
can exempt only issues which in reality represen: local financing by local
industries, carried out purely through local purchasing. In distributions
not of this type the requirements of section 3(a) (11) will be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill.54
The Commission's concern and its resulting attitude are not without
merit, and will most likely continue, surfacing in its future interpre-
tation of § 3(a)(11) and rule 147. The express purposes of the Act
are to provide full and fair disclosure of securities distributed in inter-
state commerce and to prevent fraud in connection with such distribu-
tions.55  The registration and prospectus requirements are designed to
meet these objectives, principally that of full disclosure 0  The exemp-
tions contained in the Act are exemptions only from the registration
5 3SARel. 5450.
54 SA Rel. 1459. See also Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, Securities
and Exchange Commission, Pt. 1, at 571-72 (1963), [hereinafter cited as the Special Study];
Gadsby, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financing of Small Basinoij,
14 Bus. LAw. 144, 148 (1958).
55 The preamble to the Act has always contained the following: "To provide full and
fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." 48
Stat. 74 (1933).
56 See House Committee Report No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. p. 8 (1933) which provides:
The purpose of these sections [Sections 2 (1) and 10 of the Act] is to secure for
potential buyers the means of understanding the' intricaies of the transaction into
which they are invited. The full revelations required in the filed 'registration state-
ment' should not be lost in the actual selling process. This requirement will un-
doubtedly limit the selling arguments hitherto employed. That is its purpose. But
even in respect of certain types of listed issues, reputable stock exchanges have al-
ready, on their own initiative, recognized the danger of abbreviated selling literature
and insisted upon supervising the selling literature distfibuted in connection with
such issues, to make certain that such literature includes the same information con-
cerning the issuer required in a formal circular filed with and approved by such
exchanges. Any objection that the compulsory incorporation in selling literature
and sales agreements of substantially all information concerning the issue will
frighten the buyer with the intricacy of the transaction states one of the best argu-
ments for the provision. The rank and file of securities buyers who have hitherto
bought blindly should be made aware that securities are intricate merchandise.
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requirements, 57 and for the most part are justified by balancing the pro-
tections afforded by the disclosure system against the ability to enforce
registration and the need for such protections in light of the nature of
the issuer, the type of security, or the nature of the probable investor."
Purchasers of securities constituting part of a widespread public offer-
ing within a single state normally do not, in the probable view of the
Commission, have any special sources of protection that distinguish them
from investors in public interstate offerings, other than, perhaps, some
additional state supervision in varying amounts and quality not otherwise
available or exercised in interstate offerings. Consequently, it is reason-
able to expect the Commission by narrow construction and aggressive
enforcement to resist use of the exemption for large intrastate public of-
ferings, and to confine its applicability to offerings more closely akin to
one "by a small businessman of a limited amount of securities to his
friends, relatives, business associates, and others"-- which the Commis-
sion probably could not now effectively regulate through registration in
any event. As we shall observe, the existing judicial and administrative
interpretations make, and the incorporation of these and other restrictive
standards into rule 147 will make, reliance upon the exemption exceed-
ingly dangerous in large offerings necessitating involvement of the broker-
age community in the distribution process.60
II. THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION-PRINCIPAL INTERPRETIVE
PROBLEMS AND THE IMPACT OF RULE 147
The principal substantive questions that have arisen in interpreting
§ 3(a) (11) are: (1) what constitutes "part of an issue" that must be sold
exclusively intrastate, (2) what is required for an issuer to be "doing
business" within a state, (3) when is an issuer and an offeree or pur-
chaser a "resident within" a state, and (4) when may securities constitut-
ing a part of an intrastate issue be resold to nonresidents.6 For offer-
ings made in reliance thereon, rule 147 provides objective standards
57See notes 14 & 15 supra and the accompanying text.
58 Certain types of securities and certain types of transactions were determined by Con-
gress to be outside this need for disclosure or to contain sufficient protections as to limit
the need for disclosure. These securities and transactions were thus specifically exempted
from the registration requirements of the Act. For an early discussion of the philosophy
of all of the exemptions, by the then General Counsel of the Commission and his successor,
see Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 89 (1937). The exempted securities are set forth in § 3 of the
Act, the exempted transactions are set forth in § 4.
59 Special Study 570.
60 See note 54 supra and accompanying discussion and notes 149-151 infra and acoom-
panying discussion.
61 SA Rels. 4434 & 5450.
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for questions (2), (3), and (4), but for the most part leaves to cur-
rent judicial and administrative interpretations the "part of an issue"
determination, a concept that permeates other subparagraphs of the rule.
Prior to examining the interpretation and operation of the rule itself,
the current status of these principal questions will be summarized in
light of the principal substantive provisions of the rule, with particular,
emphasis on the enduring problem of determining which securities are
to be deemed part of the same issue for purposes of § 3(a) (11).
A. Part of an Issue
Section 3(a) (11) requires that no "part of an issue" be offered and
sold to nonresidents if any security comprising a part of that issue is to
qualify for the exemption; i.e. the entire issue must be offered and sold
only to residents of the state in question.02  The significance of this
requirement is that an issuer's offers or sales of securities to nonresidents
either prior or subsequent to an intrastate offering of its securities
(whether of the same or a different class) may be deemed to be part of
the intrastate issue, thereby destroying the exemption since all securities
comprising a part of that issue were not offered and sold exclusively to
residents. 3 In the jargon of the trade, the offers and sales to nonresi-
dents would be "integrated" with the intrastate offering. This is true
even though the sale of the securities to nonresidents was exempt un-
der §§ 3 or 4 or even registered under the Act-the intrastate offering
exempti6n cannot be combined with registration or another exemption
to relieve from registration that portion of the issue offered and sold out
of state.0 4  The problem is compounded when reliance for the interstate
portion of the issue is placed on an exemption having its own integration
problems.05 For example, if an Ohio issuer needing approximately
62 See releases and cases cited in notes 41 & 42 supra.
63 See Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942) (rejection of appellant's claim
that each sale or exchange of original issued shares of a common character is a separate
issue); SEC v. Los Angeles Trust, Deed & Mortgage Exchange, 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal.),
aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960) (integration of sales of identical securities by a parent
and its subsidiary); Hillsborough Investment Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960)
(integration of intrastate sales under a "substitute capitalization plan" with earlier sales of
substantially identical securities to nonresidents in violation of § 3(a)(11) ).
0 4 Edsco Mfg. Co., Inc., 40 SEC 865, 869 (1961); 1 Loss, 593; SA Re. 5450.
05The question of integration often arises in connection with the exemptions provided
in §§ 3(a) (9) and 4(2). 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a) (9) & d (1970).
The § 3 (a) (9) exemption provides that the security must be exchanged by the issuer "with
its existing security holders exclusively" (emphasis added). The use of the word "exclusively"
has led the Commission to the conclusion that the entire "issue" of securities being exchanged
must be offered to existing security holders, and any offer of that issue to non.security
holders will destroy the exemption for the entire issue being exchanged. Securities Act
Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939, 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. RPR. 5 2140.
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$1,000,000 to purchase a complex piece of manufacturing equipment fi-
nanced that acquisition by selling $500,000 worth of its common stock
for investment to a single large corporate institutional investor residing
in New York in reliance on the private offering exemption of § 4(2),
and by concurrently selling a like amount of such stock in a public offer-
ing exclusively to residents of Ohio in reliance on § 3(a) (11), then
neither exemption would be available since part of the issue was sold
publicly without meeting the standards of § 4(2) and another part of the
same issue was sold to a nonresident in noncompliance with § 3(a) (11).
Another likely situation bearing an integration problem may occur
when a company seeks to raise capital for general corporate purposes
without registration pursuant to an exempt intrastate offering. As things
develop, the company is overly optimistic and soon dries up its local
sources investment capital and halts the offering after it is only partially
sold. Still in need of capital, the company then locates an underwriter
willing to handle the balance of the issue; however, the underwriter is
able to sell the issue only if it has available the broader market provided
by its nonresident customers, or an interstate network of participating
dealers, or both. Depending on the size of the offering, a notification is
then filed with the appropriate Regional Office of the Commission under
Regulation A, 6 or a registration statement is filed with the Commission's
main office in Washington, D.C. In either event, the Commission could
be expected to integrate the original intrastate and proposed interstate of-
ferings and consider § 3(a) (11) unavailable to the prior offering. In
The § 4 (2) exemption covers transactions "not involving any public offering" (emphasis
added). The Commission has interpreted the word "offering" to require integration of offers
to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities which are a part of the same "offering" if it finds
that the particular facts and circumstances warrant such treatment. Securities Act Release
No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 1 CCH FED. SEC. L RPM. 5 2770-2783. Rule 146, note 4
supra, preserves the integration problem with no guidance in addition to an endorsement
of the 1962 release.
6615 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970) authorizes the Commission to adopt rules and regulations
exempting issuances of securities where the aggregate amount offered to the public does
not exceed $500,000 if it finds that registration "is not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited
character of the public offering." Pursuant to that authorization, the Commission has
adopted Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.262, 1 CCH FED. SEc. L RP'M 5 2359-
5 2370, exempting from registration offerings of issues up to $500,000. The availability
of this exemption depends upon compliance with the terms and conditions of Regulation
A, including the filing with the appropriate regional office of the Commission of a Form
1-A notification accompanied (in the case of offerings in excess of $50,000) by an offering
circular disclosing information required by the Regulation and a specified waiting period
prior to the effectiveness of the exemption. Like the § 3(a)(11) exemption, the exemption
provided by Regulation A is only from the registration requirements and not the antifraud
provisions of the Act. As presently administered, this "exemption" is more like a short
form registration statement than an exemption from registration. For a detailed discussion
of this exemption, see Weiss, Regulation A Under the Securities Act of 1933-Higzbsuy
and Byways, 8 N.Y.L.F. 3 (1962).
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these instances, it is generally the practice of the Commission to require
the notification or registration statement to cover not only the unsold
balance but the previously sold securities as well, and to insist that the of-
fering circular or prospectus disclose the contingent liability under §
12(1) and contain an offer of rescission to all prior purchasers.07 As a
practical matter, the company either would have to comply with the Com-
mission's wishes or wait out the one-year statute of limitations when the
contingent liability would cease 8 and the Commission presumably would
not be justified in requiring a rescission offer.
A more complex situation arises when an issuer successfully com-
pletes, at least by its definition, an interstate offering of securities (pur-
suant to registration or an available exemption) and then subsequent-
ly proposes an intrastate offering. 9 The question presented under § 3
(a) (11) is whether or not the two seemingly independent offerings are
deemed to be integrated, or more precisely, part of the same issue. The
question that must be answered has been expressed as whether there ex-
ists a "relationship between separate offers and sales of securities by an
issuer which is such as to constitute a single related or continuous distri-
bution of such securities. ' '70  Neither the Act nor the other rules and
regulations adopted thereunder offer any guidance in this respect for they
contain no definition of either "issue" or "part of an issue" as used in §
3(a) (11). There are few reported court decisions dealing with the con-
cept of integration, and, as a result, virtually all of the interpretive gloss
is provided by the Commission. With a limited exception confined to
rule 147 transactions, the Commission has refrained from providing ob-
jective standards for determining when issues are to be integrated, but
has stated in its 1961 general explanatory release on the intrastate exemp-
tion that whether an offering "is an integrated part of an offering pre-
viously made or proposed to be made, is a question of fact and depends
essentially upon whether the offerings are a related part of a plan or pro-
gram."71 This release lists five factors, "any one or more of [whichl may
be determinative of the question:"
(1) Are the offerings part of a single plan of financing;
(2) Do the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security;
(3) Are the offerings made at or about the same time;
07 See Sosin, supra note 10 at 123, for a discussion of the rescission offer procedures,
68See notes 39 & 40 supra and accompanying text.
09 The same problem would be presented if the sequence were reversed and the intrastate
offering preceded the interstate offering.
7 0 McCauley, supra note 10, at 949.
7 1 SA Rel. 4434.
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(4) Is the same type of consideration to be received; and
(5) Are the offerings for the same general purpose.7-2
No additional elaboration is offered, nor is any contained in rule 147,
which fully incorporates these five factors and perpetuates the need for
a case-by-case determination.
One author suggests that factors (2) through (5) are simply detailed
statements of factor (1), i.e. whether the offerings are part of a single
financing plan.71 This approach deserves considerable weight in deter-
mining a particular offering's susceptibility to integration, since it is dif-
ficult to foresee an actual situation in which offerings possessing the first
factor would not also include at least one of the remaining four. Like-
wise, if most or all of the last four factors were present, it would be dif-
ficult to disprove a single financing plan. As a practical matter, the Com-
mission has tended to stress the last four factors, particularly time
proximity and same class,74 as evidence of a single plan of financing since
these four are less subjective and are more capable of verification. For
example, in one recent response to a request for a "no-action letter"75 the
72 Id.
73 Sosin, supra note 10, at 124.
74 In this regard, SA Rel. 5450 provides "... the Commission, generally has deemed intra-
state offerings to be 'integrated' with those registered or private offerings of the same class
of securities made by the issuer at or about the same time." SA Rel 5349 proposing rule
147 had stated that the rule would do away with the case.by-case determination previously
required and would automatically integrate all securities sold by the issuer, its predecessor
and affiliates within any consecutive six month period. Possibly because of the adverse
reaction to this "automatic integration" provision by members of the bar, the Commission
reversed its position and returned to the case-by-case approach. Sea Letter from certain
members of the Securities Law Committee of the Chicago Bar Association to Mr. Richard
H. Rowe, Associate Director, Division of Corporation Finance, March 12, 1973.
15A "no-action letter" is an informal written position of the staff of the Commission
as to a specific interpretive question (often the applicability of the registration requirements
of the Act) rendered in response to a particular factual situation detailed in the requesting
letter. The response gets its name from the concluding paragraph of a letter favorable
to the proponent in which it is often stated that "on the basis of the facts presented the
staff will not recommend that the Commission take any action if the securities are sold
without registration under the Act," or words to that effect. The "no-action!' process
has been described as "an outstanding example of administrative accessibility and pragmatism,
enabling stockholders readily to determine whether a contemplated sales transaction may
be consummated without registration." See Recommendation No. 19, Admin. Conf. of U.S.,
1970-71 Report, '70-'71 CCH DEc. 5 78,187 (1971). While the interpretive responses
and "no-action" letters of the Commission's staff are not law in the sense that they have
been adopted through proper administrative rule-making procedures, their practical effect
in a particular transaction is substantial. The published responses of the staff generally
indicate the Commission's current thinking with respect to the interpretative question posed
but generally include little analysis.of the factors leading to the conclusion reached. The
Commission's view of the status of these responses is indicated in Securities Act Rel. No.
5098 (Oct. 29, 1970), which adopted § 200.81 (17 C.F.R. § 200.81) and § 200.90 (17
C.F.R. § 200.80) providing for the public availability of requests for and responses to "no
action" and interpretative letters, where it stated: "It should be recognized that no action
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Commission's staff found three of the last four factors to exist and con-
cluded the exemption to be unavailable in these words:
The proximity in time of the two proposed offerings, the similar
consideration to be received, and the similar use of proceeds cause the
two proposed offerings to be [in] substance one integrated scheme of
financing so that the Section 3(a)(11) exemption of the 1933 Act
would not apply to the notes since the common stock part of the offering
would be offered out of state.18
In response to another no-action inquiry,77 the staff concluded that
under the integration concept "a serious question as to the availability of
the Section 3(a) (11) exemption" wc'ild exist in the following factual
setting. A Connecticut real estate development company sold a ten-acre
garden apartment project located in Connecticut to a captive Connecticut
cooperative housing corporation (Co-op I), which in turn sold its shares
to in-state buyers who each also acquired leasehold rights to a specific
apartment unit. During the intrastate marketing of the shares of Co-op
I the developer proposed to sell a separately mortgaged, adjacent garden
apartment project to a new captive Connecticut cooperative housing
corporation (Co-op II), which would sell its shares and leasehold rights
in a registered interstate offering. The offerings of Co-op I and Co-op
II were considered subject to integration, presumably because of their
proximity in time and their common purpose in channeling to the de-
and interpretative responses by the staff are subject to reconsideration and should not be
regarded as precedents binding on the Commission."
76 Property Investments, Inc., '72-'73 CCH DEC. 5 79,123 (1972). The subject issuer
was a Texas corporation engaged in developing and marketing real estate in Texas. It
had proposed to offer $25,000,000 of non-convertible promissory notes exclusively to Texas
residents and, shortly after the termination of this offering, to register an interstate common
stock offering with the Commission. The actual time between the two offerings was not
specified in either the requesting or responding letter, but the Commission nonetheless deter-
mined that the common stock and note offerings would be integrated. But see Stratford Em-
ployees' Cattle Program, Ltd. no-action letter, CCH 5 79.761 (1974), where the proposed
intrastate sale (non-rule 147) of interests in a Texas limited partnership cattle feeding pro-
gram solely to employees of the corporate general partner and its affiliates was not integrated
with the concurrent registered interstate sale of interests in other limited partnerships conduct-
ing larger but similar cattle feeding programs and having as their sole general partner the par-
ent of the general partner in the employees' partnership. Although the intrastate and interstate
offerings would take place at the same time and would be sold for cash, the Commission con-
cluded that controlling substantial differences existed, including the price per unit ($100 vs.
$5,000 for the interstate offerings), different general partners, different accounting methods
(accrual vs. cash method for the interstate partnerships), dissimilar plans of distribution, and
the different purpose of the intrastate offering (the intrastate offering to employees was de-
signed to provide them with a convenient vehicle for investing in their own cattle feeding
operation and consequently bolster their morale and performance of their employment duties
to the cattle programs operated by the publicly-held limited partnerships).
77Presidential Realty Corp., Sylvan I Corp. and Sylvan II Corp., '70-71 CCH Dim ,
78,066 (1971).
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veloper a portion of the offering proceeds in payment of the purchase
prices of the apartment projects.7 8
The only reported court decision dealing specifically with the defini-
tion of "issue" for § 3(a) (11) purposes is Shaw v. Uniled States,9 a
1942 decision of the Ninth Circuit affirming a conviction for violation of
the registration provisions of the Act. The court first concluded that the
meaning of the term "issue" was not a question of state law and then
stated that "issue" under § 3(a) (11) "includes all the shares of a com-
mon character originally though successively issued by the corporation."' "
This seemingly equates "issue" of securities with "class" of securities, and
could, if carried to its logical conclusion, forever bar use of the intra-
state exemption for an entire class of an issuer's securities once any unit
thereof was sold to a nonresident, no matter how remote the sales in
time or purpose.8' Fortunately, this needlessly broad concept has neither
been advanced by the Commission nor indorsed in subsequent court de-
cisions. Moreover, the courts have been willing to examine offerings by
the same issuer within a close time proximity in light of all the surround-
ing facts, and to refrain from integrating the offerings when justified!'
On the other hand, the courts and the Commission have been quick to
integrate offerings structured in form to fit within the technical require-
ments of § 3(a) (11), but which amounted to indirect interstate offerings
of a single enterprise or transparent devices to avoid the intent and pur-
pose of exemption 3
7 8 This letter illustrates the Commission's willingness to integrate issuers as well as issues
when the factual pattern so requires. Another no-action letter which followed this analysis
is Commercial Credit Co., '71-'72 CCH DEc. 5 78,544 (1971) (integration of offerings
by several subsidiaries). See also Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. CIN. L REv. 779, 794-95 (1971).
79 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942).
SO 131 F.2d at 480.
8 1 See McCauley, supra note 10, at 943.
82 1n Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969), the court
refused to integrate the issuance of 1,500 shares of stock to the nonresident father of the
president of an issuer with a subsequent intrastate public offering of 20,000 shares of its
stock. The stock issued to the nonresident was in exchange for the cancellation of a prior
indebtedness and was issued prior to the registration with state authorities of the public offer-
ing. The court concluded that because the nonresident did not pay a brokers fee as pur-
chasers in the intrastate offering did, did not enter into a stock subscription agreement
with the issuer and the transaction was not on the agenda at a shareholders' meeting, this
transaction should not be integrated with the intrastate offering. Id. at 153. A similar
result was reached in SEC v. Dunfee, '66-'67 CCH DEC. 5 91,970 (W.D. mo. 1966),
where the court refused to integrate an issuer's intrastate offer and sale of six percent promis-
sory notes payable in twenty months with an intrastate offering commenced nine months
later of his seven percent promissory notes payable in thirty-six months. See note 167 infre.
83 In SEC v. Los Angeles Trust, Deed & Mortgage Exchange, 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.
Cal.), aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), the court looked through the issuer's attempx
to separate identical investment contracts being issued by it and a formerly dormant subsidi-
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The author understands that for no-action letter purposes, the Com-
mission generally does not integrate a start-up company's initial inter.
state private offering to promoters active in its inception and organiza-
tion with a subsequent intrastate offering to others to provide substantial
funds for the continued operation and growth of the enterprise, 84 al-
though the Commission would view skeptically any attempt at artificial
classification of a nonresident investor as a true "promoter." It is also
doubtful that integration would occur in the common situation where
construction or acquisition of a real estate project is financed in part by
a first mortgage loan (evidenced by a promissory note) obtained in a
private transaction from an out-of-st, .e institution, and in part by the
sale of equity securities (e.g., common stock or partnership interests) to
in-state residents, provided there was compliance with all other condi-
tions of the exemption.8 5 There are also strong indications that the Com.
mission will not integrate offerings by separate and economically dis-
tinct partnerships solely because of the existence of a common general
partner.8 6
ary. The court concluded that since the contracts were identical and the claimed subsidiary
was, in effect, a mere division of the issuer, the issuer's claim that the contracts issued
by one entity were all issued to residents of California was "a mere subterfuge intcnded
to defeat and evade the registration requirements of the Securities Act, and to create an
artificial basis for the assertions of the defendant that the 'intrastate exemption' is applicable,"
186 F. Supp. at 871. Similarly, in Hillsborough Investment Corp. v. SEC, 276 F,2d 665
(1st Cir. 1960), the court integrated a prior issuance of securities in violation of § 3(a)(11)
with a claimed "recapitalization" wherein the issuer had authorized the issuance of allegedly
new securities to be exchanged for those securities of the prior issue which had been sold
to intrastate purchasers. The court found that this was an attempt by the corporation to
regain the intrastate exemption after it was once lost and that such a result could not
be permitted under the Act.
84 See Hertz, supra note 10, at 294.
85 But see Emens & Thomas, supra note 78, at, 792, where the authors' refcr to a no.
action letter in which the Commission's staff requested additional facts with regard to certain
debt-financing arrangements, the proceeds of which were to be used along with the intrastate
offering proceeds. The use made by the staff of this information and its ultimate conclusion
are not revealed.
86 Proposed rule 147 contained a limitation to its general integration requirements (jee
note 70 supra), to the effect that offerings of securities by separate and distinct business
enterprises for separate and distinct purposes would not be deemed part of an issue solely
because both issues had the same general partner. See SA Rel. 5349. Since rule 147
as finally adopted eliminated any automatic integration of offerings by affiliates (iee rule
147(b)) the Commission deemed the limiting proviso of the proposed rule as no longer
necessary. See SA Rel. 5450. Regulation A contains provisions similar to the proposed rule
147 proviso in its own "integration" section by providing:
The following securities need not be included in computing the amount of securi.
ties which may be offered under this regulation:
(4) In the case of an offering of interests in an unincorporated theatrical pro-
duction, interests in any affiliated unincorporated theatrical production; or
(5) In the case of an offering of interests in an unincorporated issuer orga-
nized to hold title to, lease, operate or improve specific real property, interests in
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Avoiding loss of the exemption as a result of prior or future inter-
state offers or sales of securities can be a particularly troublesome and
complex matter. Careful investigation is essential to uncover any pos-
sible "integratable" offerings, and such possibilities can surface in unex-
pected ways, such as a result of acquisitions of businesses for securities,
the offer or sale of securities pursuant to employee stock options and
other incentive plans, the exercise of outstanding warrants, out-of-court
settlements for securities with trade creditors, and, perhaps, concurrent
debt financing arrangements.
Rule 147 does not eliminate or clarify the integration question, ex-
cept for a partial elimination under limited circumstances, and it will
continue to plague all offerings made i reliance upon § 3(a)(11),
whether or not made under the rule.
B. Doing Business
Section 3(a) (11) requires that the issuer of the securities be "doing
business" within its state of residency. The principal questions left un-
answered by the statute are what types of activities constitute doing busi-
ness, how much of such business activities must the issuer be doing with-
in the state, and whether and to what extent can the proceeds of an
intrastate offering be used to finance an issuer's out-of-state business oper-
ations. These questions are answered with great specificity and objective
criteria by rule 147 for offerings made under the rule.
Case law under the Act has established that the business required to
be done in the state must be "something substantially more than has been
held sufficient to subject one to service of process in civil suits."" In ad-
dition to such "presence" in, or sufficient "minimum contacts" with, a
state required for jurisdictional purposes, 88 doing business for purposes
of § 3(a) (11) also means something more than the conduct of ac-
counting and recordkeeping functions in, or the offer and sale of its se-
curities from, that state, even if such administrative office was the prin-
cipal or only such office of the issuer.8 The critical judicial test has
been whether income-producing operations of the business in which the
issuer is selling the securities are conducted in the state. 0 In Chapman
any affiliated issuer organized to hold title to, lease, operate or improve other spe-
cific real property.
Rule 254(d) under the Act;, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254; 1 CCH FED. SEc. L RPTR. 3 2362.
8 7 Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 157 (6th Cir. 1969).
88See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
89 414 F.2d at 157-59; SA Rel. 4434.
90 414 F.2d at 158. See also SEC v. McDonald Invest. Co., 343 P. Supp. 343, 345
(D. Minn. 1972).
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v. Dunn,9' where a Michigan resident sold to local residents fractional
interests in oil and gas wells located in Ohio, and the only other business
activities conducted in Michigan were the recordkeeping for and man-
agement of the out-of-state oil and gas interests, the court, over a strong
dissent, 2 denied the exemption since virtually no income-producing op-
erations were conducted in Michigan. The Chapman majority further
held that the "issuer must conduct a predominant amount"913 of its in-
come-producing business in the state. Although it has been suggested
that this terminology of "predominant" may be labeled as dictum under
the facts since all or virtually all income-producing operations were lo-
cated out-of-state,94 it nevertheless ha, caused justifiable concern among
members of the securities bar, particularly those representing issuers con-
ducting intrastate offerings in states within the Sixth Circuit, and has no
doubt resulted in the abandonment or restructuring of many financings.
In the recent case of SEC v. McDonald Investment Co.,," the district
court, after declaring the question to be a close one, held that the doing
business test was not met when a Minnesota issuer's sole business opera-
tion was to be the making of secured loans to out-of-state land developers.
The court found that the issuer's income-producing operations would
''consist entirely of earning interest on its loans and receivables invested
outside the. State of Minnesota."90 . Although the issuer would not par-
ticipate in any of the land developers' operations or have any ownership
interest therein, the court further concluded that the strength of the se-
curities (unsecured general debt obligations of the issuer) sold to the
in-state investors depended as a practical matter, if not legally, "to a
91414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969).
92 Dissenting Judge McAllister pointed out that "no language in the Act, itself, purports
to provide that performance of substantial operational activities is an essential to a corpora.
tion's 'doing business' in the state of its incorporation." Id. at 161. He went on to argue
that the state securities commission* was well-equipped to regulate offerings of the type
involved in this case and concluded that "the Michigan Corporation and Securities Commis-
sion, dealing with a Michigan corporation, could better investigate, inspect, regulate, anti
supervise the security transactions relating to oil wells in Ohio than the Federal Securities
and Exchange Commission." Id. at 163.
93Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
94See 31 OHIO ST. L.J., supra note 10, at 530. A further precedental limitation to
the Chapman holding was the district court's finding that two of the investors were non-
residents of Michigan. Thus, even if the court had concluded the issuer was "doing business"
in Michigan, the exemption would have been lost by its failure to limit offers and sales
to Michigan residents. On this question, the appellate court stated: "For the purposes of
this opinion we pretermit decision of the question of whether all the sales were made
to 'persons resident within a single state' and proceed to determine whether the issuer was
'dbrng business' in Michigan within the meaning of the above-quotcd exemption." 414
F.2d at 155.




large degree on the success or failure of land developments located out-
side Minnesota, such land not being subject to the jurisdiction of the
Minnesota court." 7 The court cited with approval the Chapman "pre-
dominant amount" standard," but it did not attempt to quantify "pre-
dominant" since it found, as did the Chapman court, that all or virtually
all of the issuer's income-producing operations would be located out-of-
state. The McDonald case, then, is more important for the holding
that the lending of funds to out-of-state businesses did not constitute a
type of activity that will meet the "doing business" test under § 3(a)
(11).99
Prior to Chapman, the Commission took the position that the doing
business requirement "can only be satisfied by the performance of sub-
stantial operational activities in the state .... 100 Drawing support from
Chapman, the Commission has adopted and quantified the "predomi-
nant" test in rule 147, which generally requires that eighty percent of
the issuer's consolidated gross revenues must be derived from in-state
operations.1"' In view of the rule's provisions and the Commission's
statement in the accompanying release that the issuer's "principal or
predominant business must be carried on""' ' in its state of residency, the
chances are remote that the Commission would dip appreciably if at all
below the eighty-percent standard in non-rule transactions.
The Commission has introduced in rule 147 an additional, virtually
unprecedented, doing-business standard by requiring that eighty per-
cent of the issuer's consolidated assets be located in the state of its resi-
dency. 13  While this test may operate to foreclose use of the rule to
some truly local businesses, 04 the Commission certainly now will apply
some asset test to non-rule transactions, and there is no reason to believe
it will be depart from the test contained in the rule.
Although rule 147 imposes very high doing-business criteria, the il-
lustrative examples contained in the release accompanying the rule indi-
cate the Commission will not be unduly restrictive in its interpretation
of the nature of the activities that qualify as business done in-state.103 In
97343 F. Supp. at 345.
981d.
09See note 111 infra and accompanying text, regarding the nature of in-state business
qualifying under rule 147.
loo SA ReL 4434 (emphasis added).
l01 Rule 147 (c) (2) (i). See notes 169-170 infra and accompanying text.
10 2 SA Rel. 5450.
103 Rule 147 (c) (2) (ii). See note 173 infra and accompanying text.
104 See note 174 infra and accompanying text.
10 5 SA Rel. 5450. See notes 171-172 infra and accompanying text.
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light of this anticipated construction by the Commission and the endorse.
ment of the "predominant" standard by the Commission and the Chap-
man and McDonald courts, it is also reasonable to assume that the courts
will adopt substantially the rule's eighty-percent test for purposes of de.
fining the amount of revenues that must be produced from in-state oper-
ations in non-rule transactions. Adoption by the courts of the rule's
asset test, however, is less predictable. While it is probable that some
asset standard may be adopted, at least in marginal cases, the lack of ju-
dicial precedent and the possibly prohibitive character of the eighty-
percent standard may offer the courts greater leeway in quantifying the
asset standard, particularly where the issuer was well within the gross
revenues tests and in all other respects constituted a local enterprise.
Another troublesome question, now answered for transactions rely-
ing on rule 147, is whether and to what extent the proceeds from an
intrastate sale of securities can be utilized by the issuer for its out-of-
state business activities. In what has become a leading case, the district
court in SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc.10 0 held the exemption unavail-
able to a $4,080,000 common stock offering by a California issuer that
kept its books and records in California and owned and operated a small
(total assets $12,630) wholesale pharmaceutical business in San Fran-
cisco. The proceeds of the offering, however, were to be used for the
unrelated purpose of acquiring, refurbishing, and operating a hotel in Las
Vegas, Nevada. Although the court in its brief opinion gave no reasons
for holding the exemption unavailable, the result is clearly correct on the
facts since after the offering the issuer would be conducting only a nomi-
nal amount of its income-producing activities in California. However,
the case has been relied upon by the Commission as the sole basis for its
sweeping statement in the release adopting rule 147 that ". . . substan-
tially all of the proceeds of the offering must be put to use within the
local area.'0107 This standard is incorporated in rule 147 where "sub-
stantially" also is quantified as eighty percent.' 8 This represents an ex-
tension of the Commission's earlier position as contained in its 1961 re-
lease where it viewed Truckee as requiring. only that the proceeds of the
offering could not be used "primarily for the purpose of a new business
conducted outside the state of incorporation and unrelated to some inci-
dental business locally conducted."' 00  Although neither construction is
supported by the court's opinion and both go well beyond that required
100 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
107 SA Rel. 5450.
108 Rule 147(c) (2) (iii). See note 177 infra and accompanying text.
109 SA Rel. 4434.
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on the facts of the case, there is little reason to believe that the Commis-
sion will vary from the rule's use-of-proceeds test in non-rule transac-
tions.'
Under the Commission's interpretation, inconsistent and unwarranted
results may occur. For example, a hypothetical issuer having $900,000
in both assets and revenues, $100,000 of which are located or produced
from operations outside the state of incorporation, would be permitted
to sell common stock in an intrastate offering to raise $100,000 for local
purposes. On the other hand, the Commission's position would preclude
a $100,000 intrastate common stock offering for purposes of funding
a similar, but out-of-state, operation by an identical hypothetical issuer
in that state having the same $900,000 in assets and revenues, except that
they all are located or produced from operations in the state of incorpo-
ration."' In each case the investor would own an undivided interest
in identical corporations having ninety percent of their assets located in-
state and ninety percent of their gross revenues produced by local opera-
tions, yet, in the Commission's view, the first corporation would satisfy
the statute's doing-business standard and the second would not.
A suggested approach to the use-of-proceeds question for non-rule
transactions that is both compatible with the language of the statute and
consistent with the concept of local financing for local businesses, is to
test the issuer under the applicable standard for the amount of its in-
state business both as constituted before and as it will be after the suc-
cessful completion of the offering, provided the security received by the
investor entitles him to an undivided interest in or a general claim against
the issuer, and does not limit the interest or the claim in whole or in part
110 There is some supporting dicta in SEC v. McDonald Invest. Co. where the court
stated, almost as an afterthought: ". . .yet to relieve [the issuer] of the federal registration
requiremens where none or very little of the money realized is to be invested in Minnesota,
would teem to violate the spirit if not the letter of the Act." 343 F.2d 343, 346. This
conclusion was not necessary to support its ultimate holding since the court had already
found that the issuer's income-producing activities, after completion of the offering, would
consist entirely of out-of-state activities.
M In SA Rel. 4434 the Commission stated: "If the proceeds of the offering are to
be used primarily for the purpose of a new business conducted outside of the state of
incorporation and unrelated to some incidental business locally conducted, the exemption
should not be relied upon."
In Tait v. North Am. Equit. Life Assur. Co., 92 Ohio L Abs. 551, 25 Ohio Op. 2d
451, 194 N.E.2d 456 (c.p.), aff'd per curiam, 195 N.E.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1963), apperl
dismissed, 176 Ohio St. 240, 199 N.E.2d 3 (1964), an underwriter failed in a breach
of contract action against an issuer which terminated prior to completion a stock offering
daimed to be exempt under § 3(a) (11). The issuer was newly-formed and the purpose
of the offering was to raise the capital necessary to expand its fledging life insurance business
under Ohio law. During the course of the offering the issuer acquired by merger a Maryland
insurance company doing the bulk of its business in that state. The offering was terminated
when the staff of the Commission took the position that the intrastate exemption was no
longer available since the issuer was not "doing a substantial insurance business in Ohio."
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to the issuer's out-of-state operations.112 The analysis would be the same
whether the out-of-state business was related or unrelated to the in-state
business, and the ultimate use of the proceeds would be irrelevant,"a
provided the.issuer was essentially a local business both before the of-
fering and after giving effect to the application of the proceeds. Such a
standard is all that is required by § 3(a) (11), which makes no reference
to use of proceeds, and its application would have produced the same de-
nial of the exemption found by the courts in the Truckee, Chapman, and
McDonald cases. However, since the Commission has codified its use-of.
proceeds interpretations in rule 147, issuers will be well-advised to con-
form as nearly as possible to the rule's eighty-percent test unless they
are prepared to champion this suggested more appropriate, but yet un-
proven, standard in the courts.
C. Residency
(1) Of the Issuer
Section 3(a) (11) requires that the issuer must be resident within the
state in question. Although the statute does not define residence gener-
ally, for either the issuer or the offerees and purchasers, it is specific in
one respect, providing that the residency of a corporate issuer is the state
where it is incorporated.114 No guidance for other business forms is
found in Commission releases prior to the advent of rule 147,115 nor has
112 It is essential that the investor's interest not be limited to out-of-state enterprises
of the issuer, even if that issuer would, viewed as a whole, qualify as "doing business"
in-stae. In Chapman v. Dunn, the court stated: "This business which the issuer must
conduct within the same State refers to the income producing operations of the bujint
in which the issuer is selling the securities, which in this case was the oil and gas develop,
ment operations located so.ely in Ohio. ... 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969) (emphasis
added). The Commission also stressed this factor prior to Chapman in SA Rel. 4434:
Thus, the exemptions would be unavailable to an offering by a company made in
the state of its incorporation of undivided fractional oil and gas interests located in
other states even though the company conducted other business in the state of its
incorporation. While the person creating the fractional interests is technically the
'issuer' as defined in section 2(4) of the Act, the purchaser of such security obtains
no interest in the issuer's separate business within the state.
113in SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824, 825 (S.D. Cal. 1957), the
court emphasized that the out-of-state use of the proceeds was for business "unrelated" to
the local business-the implication being that the holding might have differed if the out.
of-state business were the !ame or related to the in-state business. Similarly, in SA Rel.
4434 the Commission stated that if the proceeds of an offering are to be used for a new
business "unrelated to some incidental business locally conducted," the exemption should
be denied.
114 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970) provides that the residency of a corporate issuer
is the state or territory by which it was incorporated and within which it is doing business,
115"Prior to rule 147, the Commission staff struggled with the question of the state
of residency of partnerships in at least two no-action letter respMnses, and arrived at incon.
sistent conclusions. In American Plan Invest. Corp., '70-'71 CCH D1C. 5 78,044 (1971),
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the question of what constitutes residency of either issuers or offerees and
purchasers been litigated in any reported case. For purposes of offerings
under rule 147, the rule provides specific guidance as to the residency of
issuers in noncorporate form, including natural persons, limited partner-
ships, trusts, general partnerships, and other forms of business organiza-
tions."16 In the absence of prior court decisions and since the Commis-
sion is highly unlikely to adopt an interpretation inconsistent with rule
147, the rule's practical and workable definitions of issuer residency
should prevail in non-rule transactions. The rule clears up one previous-
ly encountered element of confusion concerning unincorporated issuers,
particularly partnerships and trusts, where the question had been whether
the residency of the individual partners or trustees controlled, or whether
the state of organization or principal place of business controlled. Under
the rule, the latter considerations govern.117
The question of issuer residency can be a special problem in the offer
and sale of subdivided interests in production leases for oil and gas prop-
erties. The Commission published the following warning in 1934, and
has yet to change it:
It must be remembered ... that there may be more than one issuer for
the same royalty interest where there have been successive subdivisions.
To secure this exemption, all of the issuers must be residents of the
State or Territory where the offering is made.' 18
With respect to the use of the exemption by a controlling person of
the issuer, the Commission stated in the 1961 release:
A secondary offering by a controlling person in the issure's state of in-
corporation may be made in reliance on a section 3(a) (11) exemption
provided the exemption would be available to the issuer for a primary
offering in that state. It is not essential that the controlling person be a
resident of the issuer's state of incorporation.119
the staff concluded that the issuance of securities by an Illinois limited partnership with
a California corporation as general partner would actually be an issuance of securities of
the corporation and the § 3(a)(11) exemption would be "clearly unavailable." In Louisiana
Motor Inns, '72-'73 CCH DEc. 5 78,902 (1972), the staff concluded to recommend no action
if a Louisiana limited partnership with three individual residents of Louisiana and an Ala.
bama corporation as general parmers offered limited partnership interests exclusively to Louis-
iana residents in reliance upon the § 3(a)(11) exemption.
116 Rule 147(c) (1) (i)-(iii). See notes 178-180 infra and accompanying text.
117Rule 147(c) (1) (i)-(ii). See note 115 jupra for the Commission staff's position
prior to the adoption of the rule. The proposed rule had required that all general partners
in a limited partnership be residents of the state in which the partnership was organized
to qualify for the exemption. See also 1 Loss at 598-600 for a further discussion of issuer
residency questions.
118 Securities Act Release No. 33-185, 17 C.F.R. § 231.185 (June 20, 1934). See also
SA Rel. 4434 and the text thereof, supra note 112.
119 SA Rel 4434.
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The Commission reaffirmed this position in the release adopting rule 147,
after making it clear that the rule itself is available only to the issuer and
not to the controlling persons.
(2) Of Offerees and Purchasers
Rule 147 also provides specific answers to the determination of the
residency of offerees and purchasers, including natural persons, corpo-
rations, trusts, partnerships, and other business organizations."" Again,
it is reasonable to expect the Commission and the courts to adopt these
practical and workable definitions in non-rule transactions.
The rule's definition of the residency of an individual as the state or
territory where he has his principal residence represents a significant
change from the Commission's prior concept of residency. Until the
adoption of the rule, the Commission had consistently equated a person's
"residence" with his "domicile," complete with the latter concept's eso-
teric requirement of an intent to maintain an abode in a certain state for
an indefinite period of time. 121 As first proposed in January 1973, rule
147 codified the Commission's historical position by providing that an
individual, in order to be deemed a resident, must: have his principal resi-
dence in the state and must not have any present intention of moving
his principal residence to another state. 2 2 The Commission stated in the
release accompanying the final rule that it deleted the intent require-
ment because of the difficulty in determining a person's intentions1 2 8
However, the Commission cautioned that "[t]emporary residence, such
as that of many persons in the military service, would not satisfy" the
test of principal residence. -4 Presumably, this caveat should not be con-
strued as a subtle reintroduction of the element of intent, although the
opportunity to do so is present since the concept of temporary residence
could presuppose a short departure from another, more permanent, resi-
dence to which the individual intends to return. Assuming the Com-
120 Rule 147(d) (1)-(3). See notes 181-185 infra and accompanying text.
121 See McCauley, Hertz, and 31 OHIo ST. L.J., supra note 10, at 945-948, 295-303
and 527-529, respectively, for a comprehensive discussion of the "residence vs. domicile"
problem.
122Proposed rule 147(d)(2) provided: "An individual shall be deemed to be a resident
of a state ... if such individual has ...his principal residence in the state .. . and has
no present intention of moving his principal residence to a different state. . . ." Although
SA Rel. 5349 stated that the proposed rule "does abandon the domicile test and attempts
to provide more objective standards for determining when a person is considered a resident,"
the actual wording of the proposed rule would have required, as a practical matter, an
analysis very similar to that involved in determining a person's domicile under the prior
administrative test.




mission meant the full import of its words regarding the deletion of the
intent requirement, the reference to temporary residence is best inter-
preted to depict a situation, such as the relocation of military persons
from camp to camp for short periods of time, where it is known that the
residency in that state will revert or change to another within a relative-
ly short period of time as a result of known facts or external forces,
whether or not the individual intends or desires, or has any practical con-
trol over, a move to another state. The reference to temporary residence
in the military context is also consistent with, aud probably motivated by,
the Commission's belief that military posts have been prime targets for
purveyors of unregistered securities,'- ' who have oftentimes employed
fraudulent practices.
The use of any subterfuge that would circumvent the residency test
will, of course, be disallowed. For example, the use of a nominee resi-
dent agent to buy securities on behalf of nonresidents was first
squelched by the Commission in 1934,1-6 and the resident agent utilizing
such a device could well find himself an unwitting statutory underwriter
with the incumbent liabilities associated with participation in an unlaw-
ful distribution of unregistered securities. 2 7  Similarly, careful counsel
have advised against the formation of a new or resurrection of a dormant
resident corporation solely for the purpose of affording the nonresident
shareholders thereof a vehicle for purchasing securities in an intrastate
offering, particularly if the corporation has no substantial economic pur-
pose other than ownership of those securities. 28
In its 1961 release, the Commission noted that in connection with
underwritten intrastate offerings "the nonresidence of the underwriter or
dealer is not pertinent so long as the ultimate distribution is solely to res-
idents of the state."' -9  This statement by the Commission should not
125 McCauley, supra note 10, at946 n.38.
'
2 6 Securities Act Release No. 33-97, 17 C.F.R. § 231.97 (Dec. 28, 1933). See Adio
SA Rels. 201, 4434, & 5450. In Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC. 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir.
1965), the court agreed with the Commission that a subscription of stock in the name
of a Florida resident with the intent to transfer the stock to an out-of-state purchaser, followed
by the transfer to that purchaser, caused a loss of the § 3(a)(11) exemption.
127 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) defines "underwriter" as "any person who has purchased from
an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with,, the distribution
of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertak.
ing, or jiarticipates or has a partidpation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any
such undertaking...." For examples of the broad scope of this definition and the type
of activities constituting one an underwriter, see SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th
Cir. 1966); SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Min. Co., 167 F. Supp. 248 (D. Utah 1958);
and SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.) af'd, 448 F.2d
652 (5th Cir. 1971).
128 See note 182 infra and accompanying text.
3.'2 SA Rel. 4434.
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afford complete comfort to the nonresident underwriter or dealer in an
underwriting where it acquires ownership of the securities, however tem-
porarily, prior to resale. The problem is compounded considerably if the
underwriter or dealer, as a result of a slow-selling offering, retains own-
ership of the securities for a period of time approaching that of constitut-
ing the underwriter or dealer an investor, rather than a distributor, of the
securities. A violation would surely occur if the offering were terminated
while the nonresident underwriter or dealer retained ownership."'
Outstanding options and warrants can be particularly troublesome
when originally sold in reliance on the intrastate offering exemption.
Since they constitute continuing offers of the underlying securities to
the holders thereof,13' a holder who moves to another state automatical-
ly places the issuer in violation of the statute if the option or warrant re-
mains exercisable. Moreover, if the nonresident holder then exercises
the option or warrant, the issuer finds itself on the horns of the prover-
bial dilemma since it is contractually obligated to deliver the security
upon tender of payment,"3 2 but will violate § 5 of the Act if it does.
Consequently, careful issuers include in the options and warrants sold
on an intrastate basis provisions making. them nontransferable to nonresi-
dents and exercisable only by residents.3 3  The same problems regarding
options and warrants will continue in rule and non-rule transactions.1" 4
Although the conversion of a convertible security constitutes a "sale"
of the underlying security under the definition contained in § 2(3) of
the Act,'35 the Commission administratively has determined that the stat-
130 In response to a no-action letter request, Subaru of America, Inc., '7273 CCH
DEC. 5 79,233 (1973), the staff concluded that 15,000 shares of stock received by an under-
writer as compensation in a 1968 intrastate offering and an additional 5,000 shares received
by the president of the underwrizer as a "gift" from the issuer's president in 1970 could
not be resold to out-of-state residents without registration in 1973 because they "represent
an unsold allotment of an intrastate offering."
13 1 See 1 Loss 299-300. Under § 2(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970), im-
mediately exercisable stock options or warrants constitute continuing offers of the underlying
securities.
132 Since a warrant constitutes a security under article 8 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, the issuer must comply with the terms of the instrument and may be required to
deliver the underlying security to the holder of the warrant, Sea §§ 8.202(1) & 8.314(2).
133 Even with this degree of advance planning, things can still go wrong. The author
is aware of one situation where the issuer took elaborate steps to protect against the exer-
ci.e of intrastate warrants by nonresidents over the five-year life of the warrants, Then
a few years after the offering, for sound corporate reasons, the issuer changed its corporate
domicile by merging into a Delaware subsidiary, thereby unwittingly destroying the exemp.
tion for the outstanding warrants since the issuer was no longer a resident of the sane
state as the offeree warrant holders.
134 See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
'35 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970) provides:
The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell," "offer for sale,"
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utory exemption for the conversion of convertible securities is a sufficient
basis for viewing the conversion of convertible securities differently from
the exercise of options and warrants.13  As a result, convertible securities
originally sold in a valid intrastate offering can, after the issue has
1come to rest," be resold to and converted by nonresidents without loss
of the exemption. Rule 147 reaffirms the substance of this interpreta-
tion.1
3 7
An often perplexing question, and one that is not answered by rule
147, is presented by the intrastate sale of securities on an installment
purchase basis to a purchaser who changes his state of residence prior
to completion of his payments. The issue is whether a new sale is ef-
fected for purposes of § 3(a) (11) each time a payment is made by the
nonresident, or the payment is merely in partial payment for a single,
mutually enforceable sale of the entire amount of the securities subject
to the agreement. This in turn should depend on whether the purchaser
in effect is making a new investment decision to buy or not buy with each
payment, having the legal or practical right to do so without significant
consequence under the terms of the purchase agreement. For example,
if the purchase agreement were severable or separable in that a separate
purchase and sale occurred with each payment, or if it contained provi-
sions the effect of which were to allow the purchaser to cease making
payments and retain some guaranteed portion of the securities he con-
tracted to buy, then the arrangement might be deemed a series of sepa-
or "offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an of-
fer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value. The terms defined in this
paragraph and the term "offer to buy" as used in subsection (c) of section 77e of this
title shall not indude preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer
(or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by n issuer, or
under direct or indirect common control with an issuer) and any underwriter or
among underwriters who are or are to be in privity of contract with an issuer (or
any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by an issuer, or under di-
rect or indirect common control with an issuer). Any security given or delivered
with, or as a bonus on account of, any purchase of securities or any other thing,
shall be conclusively presumed to constitute a part of the subject of such purchase
and to have been offered and so!d for value. The issue or transfer of I right or
privilege, when originally issued or transferred with a security, giving the holder of
such security the right to convert such security into another security of the same is-
suer or of another person, or giving a right to subscribe to another security of the
same issuer or of another prson, which right cannot be exercised until some fu-
ture date, shall not be deemed to be an offer or sale of such other security; but the
issue or transfer of such other security upon the exercise of such right of conversion
or subscription shall be deemed a sale of such other security.
1 3 6 5A Rel. 4434 provides: "Also, reliance should not be placed on the exemption for
an issue which includes warra.nts for the purchase of another security unless there can be
assurance that the warrants will be exercised only by residents. With respect to convertible
securities, a section 3(a)(9) exemption may be available for the conversion."
137See notes 190-192 infra and accompanying text.
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rate sales and the exemption would be lost.1 8s On the other hand, if
the arrangements were such that the issuer had the right, but not the
obligation, to terminate the sale upon default in payment and withhold
delivery of the balance of the securities or demand their return if pre-
viously delivered, this right alone should not affect an otherwise valid
exemption since the nonresident investor does not have the right to make
a new investment decision with each payment obligation and the stated
remedies would no doubt be available to the issuer, at least as a practi-
cal matter, in any event.
D. Resales to Nonresidents
When and under what circumstances can securities offered and sold
under the intrastate exemption be reoffered and resold to nonresidents?
The express terms of § 3(a) (11) provide no guidance, as all that is
specifically required is that the entire issue be "offered and sold to persons
resident within a single State or Territory." Since the Act is addressed
to the distribution of securities, and requires registration of securities in
distribution unless expressly exempt therefrom, the intrastate exemption
is not available unless the entire issue has been distributed solely to resi-
dents of the state of the issuer's residency. In other words, the intrastate
issue must have "come to rest" solely in the hands of residents before
reoffers and resales to nonresidents may commence. 1 9  As a minimum
then, reoffers and resales to nonresidents may not be effected while the
intrastate offering is in progress.
Theoretically, at least, the issue could come to rest, and resales to
nonresidents could begin, as soon as all the securities had been sold to
resident investors.40 It would be a frustration of § 3(a) (11), however,
to permit resales to nonresidents, or the development of an interstate
market, immediately after the sale of all the securities to residents if such
sale were merely the first step in an ultimate plan of multi-state distribu-
tion. The reported administrative cases and court decisions are replete
with examples denying the exemption where the reoffers and resales by
the resident buyers established or strongly inferred a plan of distribution
beyond the residents of a single state, particularly where the initial resi-
138 See Hertz, supra note 10, at 302-OP3 McCauley, supra note 10, at 946.
139 As early as 1934, the Commission alluded to the "come to rest" theory in its state.
ment: "It is clearly required that the securities at the time of completion of ultimate distribu.
tion shall be found only in the hands of investors resident within the state." SA Rel.
201. See also SA Rel. 1459, Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 SEC 147 (1935); SEC
v. Hillsborough Invest. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D. N.H. 1958)
140 See Wander, Review of "Business Organization--Securities Regulation," 23 Bus.
LAW. 1237, 1238-39 (1968).
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dent buyers were either underwriters, dealers, or in some way affiliated
with the issuer. 4'
Since the concept of intrastate versus interstate distribution carries
with it the element of the subjective intent of the issuer and resident
purchasers, the Commission has long attempted to resolve the question
by examining post-offering facts as evidence of the presence or absence
of such intent:
This is not to suggest, however, that securities which have actually
come to rest in the hands of resident investors, such as persons purchas-
ing without a view to further distribution or resale to nonresidents, may
not in due course be resold by such persons, whether directly or through
dealers or brokers, to nonresidents without in any way affecting the
exemption. The relevance of any such resales consists only of the evi-
dentiary light which they might cast upon the factual question whether
the securities had in fact come to rest in the hands of resident investors.
If the securities are resold but a short time after their acquisition to a
nonresident this fact, although not conclusive, might support an infer-
ence that the original offering had not come to rest in the State, and that
the resale therefore constituted a part of the process of primary distribu-
tion; a stronger inference would arise if the purchaser involved were a
security dealer.142
As a result of the Commission's position based on the intent of the pur-
chaser, it became the common practice in intrastate offerings to: (1) ob-
tain representations and covenants from purchasers that they were bona
fide resident domiciliaries of the state, were purchasing the securities
for their own account with no intent to reoffer or resell them to non-
residents of the state, and that no sale or other transfer would be
made to a nonresident during the course of the offering and thereafter
unless the securities were then registered under the Act or the issuer
had received an opinion of counsel to the effect that such resale would
not cause the intrastate exemption to be lost; (2) include a legend on
the. certificate representing the security reflecting the substance of the
transfer restrictions; and (3) issue stop transfer instructions to the is-
suer's transfer agent. 4 ' Many issuers would not specify a time period
following the completion of the offering during which such restrictions
141 E.g., Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957) (issuance
to broker who transferred sixty percent of shares to out-of-state purchasers); Capital Funds,
Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965) (sale to salesman of broker-dealer followed
by resale within days to non-resident); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359
(6th Cir. 1970) (finding that broker-dealer knew or should have known purchasers, after
commencement of trading in the stock, were nonresidents).
142 SA Rel. 4434. SA Rel. 1459 contains substantially identical language and concludes
that an inference that the original purchase was not for investment "would naturally be
created if the seller were a security dealer rather than a non-professioal."
14 3 See 31 OHIo ST. UJ., supra note 10, at 536-38.
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on transfer would be in effect, for to do so might imply a prohibited
present intent to resell to nonresidents at some future time. Most coun-
sel, however, would render the necessary opinion, other factors being
equal, after approximately one to two years, or simply advise the issuer
to waive the opinion condition after that time.
Until the advent of rule 147, the Commission bad not officially des-
ignated any time period following the completion of the offering after
which residents could safely resell to nonresidents. 144  Providing much
needed clarity to this question, rule 147 prohibits reoffers and resales to
nonresidents during the course of the offering plus an additional nine
months thereafter. 4 The Commission will no doubt apply this standard
in non-rule transactions, at least in situations not involving a clear pre-
conceived plan for a deferred interstate distribution. 'Moreover, since
the rule's approach is both pragmatic and a reasonable attempt to carry
out the statutory objectives, it probably also will provide an acceptable
benchmark to the courts. The reported cases dealing with the resale
question generally have involved offerings distributed by securities deal-
ers with resales to nonresidents occurring either during the course of the
offering or so close to its purported "completion" that it had been rela-
tively easy to conclude the resales were a part of the original distribu-
tion. 40 The courts have not been called upon to respond to the more
difficult question presented by isolated resales to nonresidents a few
months after the original offering. Although it is likely that the courts
will give great weight to the rule's nine-month limitation in such non-
rule transactions, it should still be possible to argue persuasively that, in
view of all the facts and circumstances, the offering had come to rest in-
state and the questioned resale to a nonresident was made without a
prior intent to do so at the time of the initial purchase. 147
144 In Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 SEC 147, 162-63 (1935), the Commission,
in dicta, suggested that the one-year period during which securities were presumed to be
in distribution under the dealer exemption contained in the third clause of § 4(1) of the
Act as then in effect could serve as a basis for a rebuttable presumption that an offering
comes to rest after one year for purposes of § 3(a)(11). The Commission has not subse-
quently reaffirmed a rebuttable presumption of any duration, certainly not the forty.day period
substituted in 1954 for the one year period of the dealer exemption now contained In
§ 4(3)- See notes 35-37 supra an'd accompanying text, for a discussion of the broker and
dealer exemptions and their relationship to the intrastate offering exemption.
145 Rule 147 (e). See notes 187-189 infra and accompanying text.
146 See note 141 supra and cases cited. See also SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp.,
173 F. Supp. 86 (D. N.H. 1958), where resales occurred within twenty to thirty days after
initial sale; Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mont. 1964), where resale to
nonresident occurred immediately after sale to resident.
'47In a no-action letter, Space Corporation, '70-'71 CCH DEIc. 5 78,096 (1971), the
Commission's staff concluded that "[a]lthough the availability of an exemption is not free
from doubt," it would recommend no action if $422,000 of debentures received for the
sale of a business in a transaction exempt under § 3(a)(11) were resold under § 4(1)
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It- is largely because of the prohibitions on interstate resales of se-
curities issued in intrastate offerings that the exemption has been of mar-
ginal utility in offerings relying on the distributive efforts of securities
underwriters and dealers. 4 - Rule 147, with its nine-month resale pro-
hibition, does little to restore this lack of utility. As a result, it will be
impossible to institute an interstate trading market after the offering,
whether it be under rule 147 or otherwise,149 and an intrastate market is
of the Act without registration. The parties requesting the no-action letter had originally
purchased the debentures in 1967 and had suffered adverse business and personal develop-
ments in the period between the purchase of the debentures and their proposed sale. The
staff appears to have reluctantly concluded that these debentures had "come to rest" prior
to their resale, but still required an opinion of counsel that the resale would be exempt
from registration.
148 SA Rel. 4434 concluded:
Consequently, any dealer proposing to participate in the distribution of an issue
claimed to be exempt under section 3(a)(11) should examine the character of the
transaction and the proposed or actual manner of its execution by all persons con-
cerned with it with the greatest care to satisfy himself that the distribution will not,
or did not, exceed the limitations of the exemption. Otherwise the dealer, even
though his own sales may be carefully confined to resident purchasers, may subject
himself to serious risk of civil liability under section 12(1) of the Act for selling
without prior registration a security not in fact entitled to an exemption from reg-
istration.
See also Gadsby, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financing of Small
Businesses, 14 Bus. LAw. 144, 146 (1958) where the author, who was then chairman of
the Commission, stated that the exemption, "due to practical considerations, is primarily
an exemption for small issues for the simple reason that the offering and sale of a large




9 See Securities Act Release No. 4386 (Jul. 12, 1961) CCH FED. SEC. L REP.
76,774 ('57-'61 Transfer Binder), in which the Commission, in an effort to clarify the
§ 3(a)(11) exemption, stated:
Not only the original sale but any further transactions effected as part of the pro-
cess of distribution to the public must be limited to residents. It should be empha-
sized, therefore, that the exemption is not necessarily available simply because ini-
tial sales are confined to residents of the state. If any person, whether or not a
professional underwriter or dealer, purchases the securities offered with a view to
resale and does, in fact, resell them to non-residents, such person may be a statutory
underwriter engaged in transactions forming a part of the distribution to investors.
Where, as a result of such a chain of transactions, the process of distribution is not
completed prior to the time the securities are acquired by non-residents, the exemp-
tion is not available to the issuer or to any other person participating in the dis-
tribution.
In the type of offering discussed above, the quick commencement of trading and
prompt resale of portions of the issue to non-residents raises a serious question
whether all of the issue has, in fact, come to rest in the hands of investors resident
in the state of initial offering. Where these practices are followed, it is likely that
portions of the issue will be offered or sold to nonresidents through residents and
dealers purchasing for resale and thus constitute elements of the distribution to in-
vestors. If so, in view of the considerations outlined above, exemption under Sec-
tion 3(a)(11) is not available and the entire issue will have been offered and sold
in violation of the Securities Act. Such an illegal distribution may nor only subject
the participants to enforcement action by the Commission, but subjects them also to
civil liability for damages or recission under Section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933. (foomotes omitted).
See generally Sosin, supra note 10, at 120-21.
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both less desirable and more difficult to police. In an underwritten
offering, one of the features normally attractive to the investors and un-
derwriters is the prospect of a trading market following the offering, and
such investors generally are not concerned about state lines (in fact, their
trading is usually effected through the dealer from whom they originally
purchased the securities). Limitation of the aftermarket to the state of
issue for a substantial period of time naturally reduces the scope and ef-
fectiveness of the trading, since most markets are generally maintained
in wholesale, over-the-counter trading between dealers of various
states.1 0 This limitation also places, as a practical matter, a virtually
impossible or unacceptable burden on the dealer's salesmen to check the
residency credentials of each prospective trading market buyer. Even
if the salesman is conscientious about his responsibility, his control is
virtually lost when the buyer is another brokerage house buying in street
name on behalf of an unidentified buyer. Moreover, as we have seen,16i
an underwriter or dealer is subjected to liability from loss of the exemp-
tion not only as a result of its own disqualifying acts, but those of others
as well, including the issuer, other dealers, and, purchasers of the se-
curities.
IIl. RULE 147-SPECIFIC PROVISIONS AND OPERATION
A. General Considerations
Rule 147 was adopted by the Commission on January 7, 1974 in Se-
curities Act Release No. 5450, and is effective for issues of securities com-
menced on or after March 1, 1974.152 Release 5450 contains a compre-
hensive explanation of the rule, and is helpful in providing insights to
the Commission's interpretation and application of the rule. It should
be reviewed as a part of any analysis of the rule.
The rule itself consists of four "preliminary notes" and six operation-
al subparagraphs: (a) the transactions covered by the rule, (b) what
constitutes a "part of an issue," (c) the nature of the issuer, including
residency and doing business in the state, (d) residency of offerees and
purchasers, (e) resales to nonresidents, and (f) required precautionary
steps against prohibited resales.
The first preliminary note provides that the rule is not the exclusive
150 See Sosin, supra note 10, at 117-18.
151 See notes 29-30 .rupra and accompanying text.
152 The rule and its benefits cannot be applied retroactively, and intrastate offerings com-
menced prior to March 1, 1974, even if continued after that date, cannot rely on the rule,
See the Commission's response to the no-action request in North American Acceptance Cor.
poration (available February 18, 1974).
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means of complying with § 3(a) (11), and the failure to satisfy all the
provisions of the rule does not necessarily mean the exemption is not
available. The Commission, however, will not be of much assistance
in determining whether and to what extent the substantive provisions of
the rule will be applied to non-rule offerings, since the Commission has
announced it will respond to no-action letter requests involving non-
rule transactions "only on an infrequent basis and in the most compelling
circumstances."' '53
Preliminary note 2 confirms that the rule does not supersede or ob-
viate the need to comply with the applicable state securities laws.
The third preliminary note briefly discusses the history and purpose
of the rule, notes its main provisions, places the burden of proving com-
pliance with the rule and § 3 (a) (11) on those who seek to rely on the
exemption, limits the exemptive relief only to the registration require-
ments of § 5, and, finally, warns "the rule shall not be available to any
person with respect to any offering which, although in technical compli-
ance with the rule, is part of a plan or scheme by such person to make
interstate offers or sales of securities." As to this caveat, Release 5450
gives as an example of such a scheme a series of offerings by affiliated
organizations in several states if what is being financed is in effect a single
business enterprise.'-"
The last preliminary note makes it clear that the rule is not available
for non-issuer, or "secondary" transactions, but that controlling persons
can rely on § 3(a) (11) if it would then have been available to the issuer
under applicable judicial and administrative interpretations.' 5 3
Rule 147(a) is the link with § 3(a) (11), providing that offers and
sales by an issuer of its securities made in accordance with all the terms
and conditions of the rule shall be deemed a transaction within the statu-
tory exemption. This subparagraph requires full and complete compli-
ance, not just a good faith or substantial compliance. Since the rule is
laced with highly technical requirements and inflexible quantifications, the
slightest deviation, however minor, will render the rule unavailable. It
also means that an offering not meeting all of the provisions of the rule
may not rely on selected provisions of the rule that it does satisfy, and
on current judicial and administrative interpretations as to the other ele-
15 3 SA ReL 5450. On the other hand, the Commission in the release did express a
willingness to provide interpretative letters to assist persons in complying with the rule.
154 Prior examples of such schemes appear in the cases cited in notes 63 & 83 supra.
But see notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text, regarding an anticipated Commission
position that it will not integrate offerings by distinct partnerships solely because of the
existence of a common general partner.
15 See note 119 supra and accompanying text, regarding the availability of the exemption
ia "secondary" intrastate offerings.
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ments of the exemption. It may well be that such an offering would
qualify for the exemption (since, as we have seen, the courts may not
find it necessary to apply all of the rule's provisions to non-rule transac-
tions),'-" but all of its elements must be tested under the then-existing
judicial and administrative interpretations, exclusive of the rule. This
distinction most likely will be of more practical significance in under-
written intrastate offerings. Since the prime benefit of the rule is the
degree of certainty of compliance with § 3(a) (11) that accompanies
transactions meeting the standards of the rule, cautious underwriters
may well refrain from undertaking those offerings where counsel is un-
able to render an unqualified opinion to the effect that rule 147 is avail-
able. Even if counsel were able to render an opinion that the exemp-
tion is available under non-rule law, many underwriters may still de-
cline, unless the deviations from the rule's standards were nominal." 7
B. Part of an Issue
Rule 147(b) (1) incorporates the "part of an issue" or "integration"
element of the exemption that has long been a part of its interpretation
by providing that "all securities of the issuer which are part of an issue
shall be offered, offered for sale or sold in accordance with all the terms
and conditions of this rule."'15 Contrary to the other major interpretive
elements of the exemption for which it provides objective standards,
rule 147 does not attempt to define or clarify "part of an issue" other
than to provide that a limited group of offers and sales will not be deemed
integrated. Thus the current judicial and administrative interpretations
must be applied on a case-by-case basis, since the rule offers no additional
guidelines other than to restate without elaboration the Commission's
same five integration factors set forth in the 1961 release. 159
As first proposed in January 1973, the rule would have integrated
all securities (other than those exempt under § 3(a) ) offered or sold by
the issuer, its affiliates and its predecessors within any consecutive six.
month period, the implication being that other offers and sales would
15oSee note 9 supra and accompanying text.
157An underwriter's reluctance to accept an opinion is not unreasonable. As broker-
dealers, underwriters are engaged in what is basically an industry regulated by the Commis-
sion under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and cautious underwriters naturally may hesi-
tate to deviate from the Commission's clear guidelines contained in rule 147. See notes 26-
40 tupra and accompanying text, regarding the liabilities and sanctions to which underwriters
are subject.
158 Rule 147(b) (1).
159Rule 147, Preliminary Note 3-and SA Rel. 5450 specifically state that a case-by-case
determination will continue to be necessary. See note 72 supra and accompanying text, listing
the five integration factors.
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not be integrated." 0 On reconsideration, the Commission found this
approach unnecessarily restrictive, and in the final rule abandoned it in
favor of incorporating the existing law and providing a limited "safe
harbor" where certain prior and future offers and sales will not be
deemed a part of the proposed intrastate issue to be effected under the
rule.' 6 ' This limited protection is available only for offerings made un-
der the rule, and is intended to have no applicability or influence in
non-rule transactions.
Under the safe harbor provisions of rule 147(b) (2), "an issue shall
not be deemed to include any offers or sales of securities of the issuer"
made "prior to the six-month period immediately preceding or after the
six-month period immediately following any offers or sales pursuant to"
rule 147, provided that each of the following conditions is met: (1)
the securities offered and sold outside the dual six-month "clean" period
were effected either pursuant to a registration statement filed under the
Act or pursuant to the private offering exemption under § 4(2) or pur-
suant to any of the exemptions under § 3; and (2) during the clean pe-
riod there were no offers or sales by or for the issuer of securities of the
same or similar class as those offered or sold pursuant to the rule. If.
these conditions are met, then securities offered and sold either before or
after the clean period will not be deemed part of the issue offered and
sold pursuant to the rule. However, all securities offered or sold during
the clean period,'whether or not of the same class, are not protected by
the safe harbor provisions, and whether or not they are integrated with
the rule 147 offering must be determined under the then-prevailing judi-
cial and administrative interpretations.6 - If these conditions are not met,
the availability of the rule to the offering is not thereby automatically
destroyed but the safe harbor protection is lost, and the question of inte-
gration with respect to all prior and future offers and sales (whether
within or without the clean period) must be determined on a case-by-
case basis under such judical and administrative interpretations.
The safe harbor provisions represent a brief but complex piece of
draftsmanship that well may engender interpretive questions and prac-
tical difficulties of a degree commensurate with those they attempt to
resolve. Initially, it may be difficult to determine the dean period dur-
ing which offers or sales of the same or similar class are restricted. It is
clear, at least, that the period will normally be in excess of twelve months,
since it would be expanded in the middle to include the time during
260 SA Rel. 5349.
161 SA Rel. 5450.
162 Rule 147, Preliminary Note 3.
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which the primary intrastate issue was being offered and sold pursuant
to the rule. It is not clear whether this means only the time during
which the securities are being offered and sold by the issuer, or some vague
additional period akin to the "coming to rest" period defined as nine
months under the rule's resale provisions. 163 The answer probably lies
somewhere in between, such as the entire period during which the selling
or marketing effort takes place, including that by the issuer, any of the
underwriters or participating dealers, or any other selling agent or in-
termediary. To provide greater certainty in establishing the beginning
of the second six-month period, issuers and underwriters may find it ap-
propriate to take some formal action to evidence the actual termination
of the marketing effort-perhaps a most difficult task for the underwriter
in a slow moving, firm-commitment underwriting where the underwriter
retains an unsold balance it can only sell in small amounts from time to
time.
The limitation of relief from integration to offers and sales of securi-
ties registered or exempt under the Act imposes an additional burden
on those seeking to rely on the safe harbor provisions, particularly un-
derwriters who may not be in as good a position as the issuer to assess
the validity of a prior claimed exemption. Although there is seemingly
little relationship between the lawfulness of a prior offering and the
question of integration, the Commission in a similar manner has pre-
viously utilized such conditions to exemptive relief as a method of en-
forcing the registration requirements.104  Be that as it may, reliance upon
the safe harbor rule will necessitate a careful legal review of prior of-
fers and sales, and, in underwritten offerings at least, will normally re-
quire the confirming opinion of issuer's counsel. It could even lead to
the circular dilemma in which a prior private offering was effected in
full compliance with § 4(2) but under circumstances where it probably
would be integrated with a proposed public intrastate offering seven
months later. Because the § 4(2) exemption would then be lost, a literal
reading of rule 147(b) (2), since it applies only for purposes of rule
147, would render the safe harbor provisions inapplicable with respect
to the prior private offering-a result that renders the safe harbor provi-
163 Rule 147(e).
164 E.g., Rule 254(a) (i), Reg. § 230.254(a) (1), 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. RPTR, i 2362,
providing that securities sold by the issuer within one year prior to a proposed Regulation
A offering "in violation of section 5(a) of the Act" will be integrated with the securities
to be sold under Regulation A for purposes of computing the $500,000 limitation. Seei
also Proposed Rule 238, Securities Act Release No. 5444 (Dec. 13, 1973), Reg. § 230,238,
1 CCH FED. S c L. RPTR. g 2358B, exempting certain options from the registration require-
ments of the Act if the gross proceeds from the sale thereof and unregittered "related
options" does not exceed $500,000.
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sions a nullity with respect to prior or future offerings relying on exemp-
tions having their own integration problems. ""
The safe harbor protections can be lost automatically as a result of
offers or sales of the same class during the clean period even if they would
not be integrated with the proposed intrastate offering under current ju-
dicial and administrative interpretations. While this result is insignif-
icant with respect to those offers and sales, it may place in doubt the
availability of § 3(a)(11) for the intrastate offering if exclusive reli-
ance is placed on the safe harbor provisions with respect to the integra-
tion of other prior or proposed offers and sales. Such a loss of the safe
harbor protections may readily occur in intrastate common stock offer-
ings, as many issuers are likely to offer or sell common stock during a
clean period with a duration in excess of twelve months as a result, for
example, of any one or more of the following unrelated, but not atypical,
instances: (1) the exercise or grant or mere existence of any stock op-
tions or warrants;'G0 (2) sales of common stock pursuant to any other
employee incentive or retirement plan; or (3) the merger, consolida-
tion, or acquisition of assets involving the issuance of common stock by
the issuer. 67
The safe harbor provisions are fraught with sufficient pitfalls to ren-
der reliance on them risky at best for most offerings. This is particularly
true of underwritten offerings in which the underwriter has little prac-
tical control over prior or future events, notwithstanding its ability to
obtain warranties and indemnification covenants from the issuer.168
C. Doing Business
Rule 147(c) requires the issuer to be doing business in the state or
territory at the time of all offers and sales. Subsection (c) (2) provides
that the issuer will satisfy the doing-business requirement if it meets
four conditions regarding (1) the amount of the issuer's gross revenues
105 The exemptions provided by §§ 4(2) and 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(2) & c(a)(9)
(1970), also incorporate the integration concept. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
166 See note 131 and accompanying text.
1G7 It is less likely that debt offerings made pursuant to the rule 147 exemption will
be integrated with prior or subsequent debt offerings to cause a loss of the safe harbor
provisions, provided the terms of the debt securities are not substantially identical. In one
case involving a debt offering, SEC v. Dunfee, '66-'67 CCH DEC. 5 91,970 (W.D. Mo.
1966), the district court concluded that seven percent notes, payable in 36 months, were
a new issue of securities that could not be integrated with six percent notes, payable in
twenty monthly installments, which had been issued by Mr. Dunfee approximately nine
months earlier. The district court reviewed the cases involving the integration of equity
offerings and found-that those cases "differ greatly" from the situation where debt instruments
with different interest rates and maturity periods are offered.
'
6s See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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derived from in-state operations, (2) the amount of its consolidated total
assets located in the state, (3) the amount of the proceeds of the offering
applied to the conduct of its in-state business, and (4) the location of its
principal office. With respect to the latter requirement, the issuer's
principal place of business must at all times during the offering be in its
state of residency.
Under the gross revenues standard, the issuer must have derived, dur-
ing the applicable measuring period, "at least 80% of its gross revenues
and those of its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis . . . from the opera-
tion' of a business or of real property located in or from the rendering of
services within such state or territory. "'6 The appropriate measuring
period depends on when during the issuer's fiscal year "the first offer
of any part of the issue is made.' 170  If it is made during the first six
months of the current fiscal year, the measuring period is the most recent-
ly completed fiscal year. If the first offer is made during the last six
months, the issuer may elect as the measuring period either the first six
months of that fiscal year or a consecutive twelve-month period consist-
ing of the last six months of the last fiscal year and the first six months
of the current fiscal year. The moving twelve-month period recognizes
the seasonal character of some businesses and permits them to calculate
gross revenues on the basis of a full operational cycle. The gross rev-
enues test does not apply to any issuer which has not had more than
$5,000 of gross revenues during "its most recent twelve-month fiscal pe-
riod." '171 Presumably this means the twelve-month period ending with
the first month prior to the month in which occurs the first offer of any
part of the intrastate issue, although the rule is silent as to the beginning
and end of that measuring period.
Examples of activities that qualify as in-state business are contained
in Release 5450, and they suggest the Commission has adopted a rea-
sonable and pragmatic approach concerning the nature of qualifying
businesses. These examples indicate that the Commission will not deem
revenues disqualified solely because they are from the sale of products or
rendering of services to out-of-state customers if the products and services
are sold or rendered from an in-state principal office and operational
center and no sales personnel or employees are located outside the state.
169 Rule 147(c)(2)(i).
170 The use of the phrase "any part of the issue" requires a determination to be made
regarding the possible integration of prior offers. If a prior, "integratable" offering had
been commenced in a fiscal period earlier than the one in which the proposed offering
is to be made, a literal reading of rule 147(c)(2)(i) would specify the earlier measuring
period, and could cause the issuer to fail to meet the eighty-percent test on the basis of




Although these examples provide some indication of the manner of the
Commission's future interpretation of the gross revenues and other doing-
business standards, they cannot respond to the virtually limitless factual
variations, which, hopefully, will provide the Commission with sufficient
incentive to further clarify the doing-business standards through inter-
pretive releases and published responses to no-action letters.' "
To satisfy the gross assets test, the issuer must have "had at the end
of its most recent semi-annual fiscal period prior to the first offer of any
part of the issue, at least 80 percent of its assets and those of its subsidi-
aries on a consolidated basis located within such state or territory."'13 Al-
though no guidance is provided in the rule, presumably the Commission
intends the standard to be eighty percent in value of the issuer's assets as
shown on the appropriate balance sheet. As assets are normally valued
at the lower of market or cost less depreciation under generally accepted
accounting principles, a difficult interpretive question arises when certain
out-of-state assets carried at a low cost, such as real property, may have
appreciated in value to the point where they represent more than twenty
percent of total assets on a market value basis. Until clarified by the
Commission, issuers should also calculate the assets test on an estimated
fair market value basis and be reluctant to rely on rule 147 where such
calculation discloses out-of-state assets having a value materially in ex-
cess of twenty percent of total assets.
Determination of the state of location may also present difficulties in
the case of certain ownership interests and intangible assets, such as in-
vestment securities, accounts and notes receivable and other claims, good
will, patents, trademarks and copyrights, and capitalized research and
development costs. Investment securities would probably be located at
the principal office of the issuer, unless the security in effect represented
an undivided interest in specific property (such as a partnership interest
in a partnership having as its only asset an out-of-state real estate proj-
ect or operating out-of-state oil and gas wells). In an example contained
in Release 5450, the Commission states that "accounts receivable arising
from a business conducted in the state would generally be considered
to be located at the principal office of the issuer." A similar conclusion
would be appropriate for other intangible assets, although issuers should
be wary when intangibles, such as good will and research and develop-
172 See note 153 supra and accompanying text regarding the Commission's unwillingness
to respond to no action letter requests regarding transactions under rule 147.
173 This standard is virtually without precedent in the pre-rule cases and releases. Ste
note 103 supra and. accompanying text. Again, the use of the phrase "any part of the issue"
raises the spectre of integration and the resulting use of an out-of-date mesuring period
unrelated to the current location of the issuer's assets. See note 170 £upra.
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ment costs, are of sufficient magnitude to increase total assets to the point
where the relationship of out-of-state tangible assets to in-state tangible
assets are distorted materially beyond a 20/80 ratio. 1" 4
The application of the asset standard could in many situations pre-
clude use of the rule by genuinely local buisinesses. Businesses with a
relatively small amount of tangible assets and low receivable balances,
such as some service organizations and selling agencies, may find satis.
faction of the asset test particularly difficult. For example, an Ohio com-
puter service bureau may have considerably more than twenty percent of
its assets invested with others in the j, :at ownership of a computer lo-
cated in Michigan; or a Pennsylvania business consulting firm, or manu-
facturer's representative, or distributor selling on consignment, may have
more than twenty percent of its assets committed to a passive investment
in real property located in Arizona. In each of these situations, the
rule's doing-business test would not be satisfied, even if all operations
and services were conducted and all customers 'were located in the is-
suer's state of residency.
Issuers with subsidiaries that do not prepare their financial statements
on a consolidated basis will be required to obtain comparable financial
information for purposes of calculating the gross revenues ,and assets
limitations. Such consolidated results are of obvious significance when
an issuer's out-of-state activities are conducted by unconsolidated subsid-
iaries. Presumably, consolidation is to be in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles recognized by the Commission for finan-
cial statements contained in registration statements filed under the Act."'
Accordingly, where consolidation is not so required with respect to cer-
tain less than wholly-owned subsidiaries, the Commission should not re-
quire their consolidation solely for purposes of the rule unless the ab-
174 For example, a Colorado company in the developmental stage of extracting oil from
shale could have as its principal assets lease rights to shale reserves located in Colorado
carried at $100,000, $400,000 of capitalized research and development costs, and $25,000
of miscellaneous tangible assets. If the company also owned lease rights to shale reserves
in an adjoining state carried at $50,000, its balance sheet would indicate approximatcly
ninety-one percent of its total assets to be located in Colorado, although only sixty.eight per-
cent of its operating assets would be located within that state. Had the research and develop.
ment costs been expensed, the company would not meet the assets test of rule 147 (c) (2) (11).
1" The Commission's general requirements for financial statements to be included in
registration statements are contained in Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. Part 210, 4 CCH FED.
SEc. L. RPTR. J0 69,101 et seq. Article 4 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.4.01..4.
09, 4 CCH FED. SEc. L. RPTR. 5 69,191-69,226 sets out specific requirements for consoli-
dated financial statements. See Reg. § 210.4-06, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-06, 4 CCH FE1D. Sec.
L. RPrR. 5 69,210, regarding the elimination of intercompany items and transactions between
the parent and the consolidated subsidiary.
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sence thereof results in a materially distorted representation of the issuer
as a local enterprise."-6
Under the third standard, the issuer fails to meet the doing-business
requirement unless "it intends to use and uses at least 807 of the net
proceeds to the issuer from sales made pursuant to this rule in connection
with the operation of a business or of real property, the purchase of real
property located in, or the rendering of services within such state or ter-
ritory."'17 Interpretive questions, similar to those arising under the gross
revenues test, are also present here regarding the nature of the activities
that qualify as in-state business operations. Additionally, what if the pro-
ceeds are to be applied in repayment of outstanding indebtedness to an
out-of-state lender? The mere fact that the proceeds are to be sent out-
of-state in repayment of a loan should not disqualify the offering under
the rule any more than should the use of the proceeds to purchase local
real estate from an out-of-state vendor. However, an issuer should be
prevented from doing indirectly that which it could not do directly. For
example, the application of more than twenty percent of the offering pro-
ceeds to repay a short-term loan recently incurred to finance an out-of-
state operation may be an example of what the Commission had in mind
when it said, in the rule's third preliminary note: "The rule shall not be
available to any person with respect to any offering which, although in
technical compliance with the rule, is part of a plan or scheme by such
persons to make interstate offers or sales of securities." Under this ex-
ample, it would make no difference whether the lender was located with-
in or without the state.
D. Residency
(1) Of the Issuer
Rule 147(c)(1) provides that an issuer shall be deemed a resident
of the state or territory in which (i) "it is incorporated or organized, if
it is a corporation, limited partnership, trust or other form of business
organization that is organized under state or territorial law,"".or (i in
which "its principal office is located, if a general partnerslip or other
form of business organization that is not organized under any itate or
territorial law."'' 1 8 The syntax of these clauses raises a question as to
the residency of a general partnership. Since most general partnerships
are organized under a specific state law, a general partnership should
176 17 C.F.R 210.4-02(a)(1), 4 CCH FED. SEc. L. Rpm 5 69,193, provides that the
registrant shall not consolidate any subsidiary which is not majority owned.
177 Rule 147(c) (2) (iii). See notes 109 & 110 tupra and accompanying text.
178 Rule 147(c)(1)(i).(ii).
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.fit under clause (i) and its state of organization would be its state of
residency. However, "general partnership" is conspicuously absent from
the listing of entities in clause (i), but is specifically named in clause
(ii), thereby indicating that its place of residency is the state or terri-
tory where its principal office is located. If the clause (ii) phrase "not
organized under any state or territorial law" is intended also to modify
"general partnership," then the residency of general partnerships orga-
nized under a specific state statute would be determined by the state of
organization like any other statutory form of business organization. The
latter seems the preferable interpretation, particularly in light of the Com-
mission's statement in Release 5450 that all business entities, including
general partnerships, should be treated in a similar manner.'"
The residency of an individual who is deemed an issuer (e.g., a pro-
moter issuing pre-incorporation certificates, or undivided fractional oil
and gas interests) is the state where his principal residence is located.
Although the Commission cautioned against "temporary residence" in
the context of offerees and purchasers,18 0 this concept well may be applied
to confine to a single state nomadic individual issuers of oil and gas in-
terests or sundry forms of investment contracts.
(2) Of Offerees and Purchasers
Rule 147(d) (1) provides that for purposes of determining the resi-
dence of offerees and purchasers, a "corporation, partnership, trust or
other form of business organization shall be deemed to be a resident of
a state or territory if, at the time of the offer and sale to it, it has its prin-
cipal office within such state or territory."''1 The state of incorporation
or organization is irrelevant, as location of the principal office is the only
test of residency of an offeree business organization. It appears that
the Commission has carefully chosen "principal office," as opposed to
some other term such as "principal place of business," to avoid any
179 InSA Rel. 5450, the Commission stated:
As initially proposed, the rule provided that in a partnership, all the general part-
ners must be resident within such state or territory. The Commission has recon-
sidered this provision in light of the provisions applicable to corporations find de.
termined to treat all business entities in a similar manner.
The author's conclusion that the residency of a general partnership organized under a specific
state statute should be its state of organization is not unanimous, Professor Hugh Sowards has
arrived at the opposite conclusion, stating, "As adopted, the rule looks to the site of the prin-
cipal office of the partnership rather than the residence of the individual partners." Sowards,
Rule 147, Rnv. SEC REG. 972 (1974).
180 In SA Rel. 5450, the Commission specifically stated that the temporary residence
of an offeree or purchaser would not satisfy the residency requirements of rule 147(d).




necessity of determining the amount or character of the offeree's in-state
business activities akin to that required under the doing-business tests
applicable to issuers.
This general test for a business organization is qualified to the extent
that if it "is organized for the specific purpose of acquiring part of an
issue offered pursuant to this rule [it) shall be deemed not to be a resi-
dent of a state or territory unless all of the beneficial owners of such or-
ganization are residents of such state or territory."'""- This codifies what
most securities practitioners have deemed the law to be, and further
confirms that the Commission's concept of "beneficial ownership" will
be applied, thereby requiring inquiry far beyond the record ownership
of the interests in the newly-formed purchaser.'"
An individual offeree or purchaser "shall be deemed to be a resident
of a state or territory if such individual has, at the time of the offer and
sale to him, his principal residence in the state or territory."184 The de-
termination of an individual's principal residence will be difficult where
two or more residences are maintained and the individual spends an ap-
proximately equal amount of time at each location. In such a case, the
determination will depend on additional factors, similar to those asso-
ciated with the ascertaining of "domicile," such as location of personal
assets, place of voting, extent of involvement in the community, place
where licensed to drive automobiles, and the nature of ownership of the
residences. Principal residence, however, does not necessarily depend on
the amount of time normally spent at a particular location. For example,
an unmarried college student may have several campus residences dur-
ing the course of his education, but his principal residence, absent other
factors, will be the principal residence of his parents. The elusive resi-
dence status of students and military personnel is probably a prime moti-
vating factor for the Commission's caveat against relying on an offeree-
purchaser's "temporary residence."""s
E. Resales to Nonresidents
With respect to resales, rule 147(h) provides that "during the period
-182Rule 147(d)(3).
18 5 See generally Securities Exchange Act Release 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966), 2 CCH FED.
SEC. L RPM. 5 26,031, and Securities Exchange Act Release 7824 (Feb. 14, 1966), 2
CCH FED. SEC. L Rum 5 26,030, issued by the Commission to "restate and clarify"
the meaning of "beneficial ownership of securities" under the Federal securities laws when
securities are held in the name of family members or other affiliates. For a general discussion
of these releases by the then Executive Assistant Director, Division of Corporation Finance,
see Shreve, Beneficial Ownership of Securities Held by Family Afembrs, 22 Bus. LAW.
431 (1967).
184 Rule 147(d)(2).
185 See note 180 supra.
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in which securities that are part of an issue are being offered and sold
by the issuer, and for a period of nine months from the date of the last
sale by the issuer of such securities, all resales of any part of the issue, by
any person, shall be made only to persons resident within such state or
territory."'18 6 It should be noted that only resales, not reoffers, are pro-
hibited.
The determination of the restricted period may be a most difficult as-
signment. Initially, one must consider whether or not any other offers
and sales of securities are to be "integrated" with the subject intrastate
offering since the restriction is keyed to the period of offers and sales of
securities that are deemed "part of" the intrastate issue. Hence, if the
offering period of such other integrated issue exceeds the offering of the
subject intrastate issue, the restricted period must be measured by the
integrated issue. This could be particularly severe in the case of war-
rants that are deemed integrated with an intrastate issue under the rule,
since the restricted period will continue for the life of the warrants
plus nine months. 87 Any sale or resale of any part of the integrated
issue to nonresidents will, of course, render the rule and the exemption
unavailable to the intrastate issue.
It is also possible that the offering period and the nine-month period
will not be consecutive, but may overlap. In a slow-selling offering,
for example, in which the last sale was made in January but the offering
continued without success through October of that year when it was ter-
minated, resales could begin immediately thereafter since more than nine
months had elapsed since the last sale.
The nine-month limitation codifies with more precision the Commis-
sion's long standing position against the creation of interstate trading
markets shortly after an initial intrastate offering. Underwriters and
dealers involved in offerings under the rule will continue to have the
same obligations and liabilities with respect to resales that existed prior
to the adoption of the rule,"88 but will have the benefit, in offerings made
under the rule, of greater certainty as to when an interstate trading
market can develop. Exclusively intrastate trading can take place during
180The subparagraph measures both the offering period and nine-month period from
offers or sales "by the issuer." Presumably this will be interpreted to mean "by or on
behalf of the issuer or any underwriter." Otherwise, for o:ample, a literal construction
would permit resales to nonresidents nine months after the issuer's initial sale to a firm
commitment underwriter, even though the underwriter continued offers and sales in distribu.
tion for more than nine months. Such a result would surely be outside the intent and
purpose of the rule, as it would sanction the simultaneous occurrence of the original distribu-
tion and resales to nonresidents.
187See notes 133-135 supra and accompanying text and note 166 Cupra,
188 See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text, and rule 147(e), note 2 supra.
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the nine-month period,ro although dealers acting as principal must also
be residents of the state (i.e. have their principal office or principal resi-
dence within the state).
A note to rule 147(e) provides that in the case of convertible secu-
rities resales of the convertible security or the underlying security must
be confined to residents during the restricted period, but that a conver-
sion in reliance on § 3 (a) (9) of the Act'"0 does not begin a new period.
This suggests that the Commission, by implication, has confirmed its
prior policy that after the restricted period the convertible security may
be resold to and later converted by nonresidents. The rule is silent re-
garding warrants and options, but in Release 5450 the Commission
stated: "In the case of warrants and options, sales upon exercise, if done
in reliance on the rule, would begin a new period." 191 As warrants and
options constitute a continuing offer of the underlying securities, 192 the
import of the Commission's statement is that warrants and options sold
pursuant to the rule may be exercised only by residents, and upon exer-
cise the underlying securities cannot be resold to nonresidents for a
nine-month period thereafter-and this is true whether they are exer-
cised during or after the nine-month period following the original of-
fering of the warrants or options by or on behalf of the issuer. Neither
the rule nor Release 5450 specifically treats the questions arising with
installment or deferred sales as a result of a subsequent change in the
state of residency of the purchaser, and the considerations relevant prior
to the adoption of the rule should be equally applicable to offerings made
under the rule.193
F. Precautionary Measures
Rule 147(f) requires issuers to effect certain mechanical procedures
129 With regard to the restrictions on the activities of underwriters, dealers and other par-
icipants during the distribution of securities, see § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, particu-
larly rule 10b-6, Reg. § 240.10b-6, 2 CCH FED. SEC L RPM. 5 22,726, regarding the
prohibitions against manipulations by persons interested in a distribution, and rule 10b.
7, Reg. § 240.10b-7, 2 CCH FED. SEQ. L RPTR. 5 22,727, regarding restrictions on the
stabilization of prices during distribution. For a practical analysis of these provisions from
the underwriter's and dealer's perspective, see Wing, Guidelines for Underuyiter Activity,
25 Bus. LAW. 397 (1970). The administrative policy and objectives underlying these provi-
sions regarding stabilization and manipulation and the Commission's determinations as to
what activities are prohibited is treated in Cohen & Rabin, Broker.Dealer Selling Practice
Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 691 (1964).
190 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1970).
19 1 SA ReL 5450.
19 2 See note 166 supra
193 See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
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designed to preserve the exemption provided by the rule and notify of-
ferees and purchasers of the resale restrictions. The required steps are:
(1) placing a legend on the certificate or other document evidencing the
security stating that the securities have not been registered under the Act
and setting forth the applicable resale restrictions under rule 147(e);
(2) issuing stop transfer instruments to the issuer's transfer agent, or,
if the issuer transfers its own securities, making a notation in its stock
records; and (3) obtaining a written representation from each purchaser
as to his residence.'94  If during the restricted resale period under rule
147(e) any outstanding certificates for securities constituting a part of
the offering are presented for' transfer, the issuer is also required to
place the legend on, and issue stop transfer instructions (or make the
appropriate notations) with respect to, the newly-issued certificates.19 5
The rule does not require the issuer to obtain a residency representation
from the transferee, although it would be advisable to do so. Finally,
the issuer is required to disclose in writing (presumably to each offeree
and purchaser) the limitations on resale under rule 147(e) and the
legend and stop transfer procedures required under subparagraph (f). 10
If a trading market is contemplated, it would be wise for these disclosures
to also make clear the limited character of that market during the re-
stricted period.
In the case of offerings continuing for an uncertain duration, the pre-
cise period during which resales are limited may not be known when the
offers and sales are made, or even when the certificates are delivered. As
a result, it will be practicable to include in the legend and required dis-
closuies only a description of how the restricted period is computed. In
these instances it generally would be advisable to notify each security
holder as soon as the termination date of the restricted period is known."'
The foregoing procedures specified in the rule, while sound measures




197 The corporation laws of most states contain provisions generally to the effect that
for a restriction on transfer to be enforceable against a transferee without actual noticc,
the stock certificate itself must warn of the restriction in sufficient detail to provide reasonable
notice to a prospective transferee. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.25(B) (Page 1970);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(a) (Supp. 1968); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-204
(providing that a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer of a registered investment
recurity is ineffective unless noted conspicuously on the security). Once the terminatlon
date of the restricted period under rule 147(e) is known by the issuer, the purpose and
intent of these state notification requirements would be best served by communication of
that date to registered security holders and its addition to the legends on new certificates
issued during the nine-month period.
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observe any one of them would render the rule unavailable. Many of
the smaller local businesses for which the rule is intended and their
counsel will not be deeply versed in the intricacies of the federal regula-
tion of securities, and the relief afforded by the rule, for which such an
issuer would otherwise qualify, would be lost irrevocably as a result of
ignorance of or some technical misstep in implementing these precau-
tionary measures.1 98 This is a harsh result, particularly when obser-
vance of the mandatory procedures carries with it no protection against
liability arising from a prohibited resale of which the issuer or the under-
writer had no knowledge or control.19
III. CONCLUSION
The welcome objective standards provided by the rule with respect to
residency and resales are achieved only at the expense of the highly re-
strictive doing-business standards and an overall technical complexity
loaded with pitfalls for inadvertent loss of the rule's benefits. Many
issuers that would otherwise have qualified for the exemption prior to
the rule will be unable or unwilling to satisfy all of its restrictive con-
ditions. For these issuers, reliance on the administrative and judicial in-
terpretations for non-rule transactions will be venturesome at best, at least
until the effect of the rule thereon has developed with greater clarity.
Taken as a whole, rule.147 represents a narrowing of the intrastate offer-
ing exemption. If only for reasons of administrative consistency, it will
be the basis for the Commission's interpretation and enforcement of §
3(a) (11). For similar reasons of consistency and the general influence
of the Commission, as well as for the pragmatic reasonableness of some
of the rule's interpretative standards, the courts are likely to construe §
3(a) (11) with great deference to the rule. As a result, the interpreta-
tion of the exemption represented by the rule will become the path from
198 For example, if the issuer fails to place the legend required under rule 147(O(1)(i)
on a single certificate, the benefits of the rule could be lost for the entire issue. Similarly
the failure by an issuer which transfers its own securities to make a proper notation in
its appropriate records, or the failure to issue a single stop transfer order when a transfer
agent is used, would cause a technical violation of the rule and, perhaps, render the rule
inapplicable for the entire issue.
199 It is possible that without the knowledge of the issuer a purchaser in an intraste
offering under rule 147 could resell the security to an out-of-state transferee during the
nine-month period in a face-to-face transaction where the nonresident transferee would not
request a record transfer until after the period had expired. Despite the fact that the
issuer had complied with all of the rule 147(f) precautions and was not aware of or a
party to the interstate resale, under the strict language of rule 147(e) the issuer could lose
the benefits of the rule for the entire offering. Moreover, this transaction would not appear
to satisfy the pre-rule administrative requirements under § 3(a) (11) and, therefore, the in-
trastate exemption itself may be lost absent some due care or good faith defense. See note 31
supra and accompanying text.
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which issuers will be hesitant to stray if another, even sounder, intaup--
tation of a particular component is available only by assuming the fiskaf-,
justifying it through litigation. In short, we can expect issuers tooseek
registration or compliance with some other exemptions for many local
offerings that prior to the adoption of rule 147 would have been effected
in reliance on § 3(a) (11).
